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Foreword
This little book is the result of a relapse. I thought I had long since been cured 
of the (juvenile) affliction of literary theory, but clearly I was not permanently 
immunized. Many years ago, when I too was a victim of the widespread epidem-
ic,1 I wrote an essay pursuing those interests. Once the fever had abated I fol-
lowed a different course. I occupied myself with interpreting poetic texts, then 
prose texts, and I composed a history of Latin literature; then I devoted myself to 
textual criticism and also prepared critical editions. In short, I practiced the usual 
trade-skills of a classical philologist. However, those earlier experiments with lit-
erary theory helped me to refine a method of textual analysis (a pursuit which 
in our profession has been honored by a long tradition of scholarship). Other 
scholars, not only in Italy but in Great Britain and the United States, have since 
accompanied me on that path, often explicitly referring to the ideas I articulated, 
at times with additions and developments.
The years have passed, not without leaving their traces. The field of textual 
analysis has changed considerably since those pages were written, and I too have 
developed some ideas in a different direction, or simply in a more nuanced and 
less rigid manner. Indeed, back when I was preoccupied with devising an organic 
system that could contain the different forms of literary imitation, I ended up 
burying among the elements of this system a procedure which for many reasons 
resisted harmonization and wanted its own space. I am referring to the arte allu­
siva, and the crucial problem of intentionality in imitation. It is not that I have 
repented of my earlier opinions, only that my second thoughts, today’s thoughts, 
seem to me more reasonable than the earlier ones.
However, if I am returning to my old haunts it is not just to make amends. 
If anything, it is to show myself more resolute than I was in those days, when I 
reasoned as if the originality of poets, at least the great ones, was diminished by 
incidental traces of imitation, and thus concluded that originality had to declare 
itself despite the blemish  caused by imitation. If I relapse now into the malady 
of theory, this is only to demonstrate (I try to do this in the first chapter, in which 
I analyse Virgil’s working over of the text of Homer) that on the contrary, imita-
tion very often is the actual path of originality, the condition thanks to which it is 
1 Memoria dei poeti e sistema letterario: Catullo, Virgilio, Ovidio, Lucano, Turin, Einaudi (1974) 
(2nd edition 1985 with an author’s epilogue): it was recently re-issued by Sellerio (Palermo 2012) 
with a preface by C. Segre. An English translation including some other later studies of mine was 
published in 1986 by Cornell University Press (Ithaca-London), edited by Charles Segal under the 
title The Rhetoric of Imitation; genre and poetic memory in Virgil and other Latin Poets.
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brought into being—at least in the classical literatures, and as I believe, not only 
there.
In the second chapter I reconstruct the presuppositions of a method. But 
above all I assess its limitations, whether negative or positive: in the negative 
column, the method contained its own deficiencies and blunders which it now 
seems to me important, in the light of experience, to point out; on the positive 
side, it turned out to be powerfully effective, if its rules were respected. Its field 
of application was narrowly circumscribed: it did well what it was able to do, 
but lost value and impact if it overstepped the threshold of its legitimacy. It 
demanded restraint in its use. “The memory of the poets” (or intertextuality, as it 
would soon after be called by that felicitous and efficacious neologism) worked 
if one recognized the dynamism of a verbal network woven with the threads of 
poetic tradition; the tradition provided the materials ready for re-use, and the 
text repurposed it for a new meaning, its own real meaning. But the meaning—
and this was the limit of the method—had to keep itself in check by respecting 
the concrete limits imposed by signs that could be practically rediscovered in the 
models, the only sure evidence of imitation.
Indeed, to allege an imitation without being able to point to convincing 
traces and proofs would be a serious betrayal of the intertextual method; it would 
emerge as invalidated beyond cure, and would lose the only merit that makes 
it strong, which consists in the ‘factual’ nature of the procedure of imitation, 
whereby the philologist is obliged in every case to supply objective evidence. This 
is a betrayal which in the recent past has been incorporated in the pages of some 
well-intentioned disciples of intertextual research, when, influenced by new her-
meneutic experiences, they have enriched the traditional method with implausi-
ble applications. I will discuss these attempts with a touch of polemic coloring in 
the last part of the second chapter, but not with hostility. I even recognize in the 
work of these scholars ingenuity, and reasoned (if not reasonable) propositions. 
But I maintain—and this is what I am trying to prove—that such speculations, 
however evocative, invalidate the method and render it untrustworthy, inasmuch 
as they undermine its empirical foundations. Perhaps to these new acolytes the 
intertextual method seemed, so to speak, “impoverished” by restricting itself 
only to the explicit data of the text, and thus unable to function without unequiv-
ocally obvious data. Perhaps it will indeed prove to be impoverished, but it is a 
mark of intelligence to accept the limits of a method. In the rich encyclopedia of 
memory, there are countless elements than that in given text might evoke, but it 
is not legitimate to believe that everything that can be memorized becomes by 
virtue of that fact a potential object of imitation. The philologist can only take into 
account candidates that are actually justified by the purported imitation itself.
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In recent years I have discussed these problems with friends but also with 
students of my seminar at the Scuola Normale of Pisa: I particularly thank for 
their suggestions Donatella Agonigi, Giulia Ammanati, Luigi Battezzato, Emanu-
ele Berti, Lisa Piazzi, Valentina Prosperi and Alessandro Tosi.
GBC
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Nihil autem crescit sola imitatione
Quint. Inst.10.2.8
Biographers often cannot resist the temptation to romanticize the facts. To 
enliven a tale, or to dramatize it they supply their characters with some bon mot 
which they actually never uttered. One of the best known among the many anec-
dotes contained in the ancient lives of Virgil reports a sharp reply that the poet 
supposedly made to his malicious detractors. Even if the anecdote should really 
be attributed to the imagination of the schoolmasters, it preserves the traces of 
a debate which would soon preoccupy Virgil’s ancient readers. When he was 
accused of having committed frequent furta in the Aeneid at the expense of of the 
Homeric poems, Virgil supposedly retorted, “it is easier to steal Jupiter’s thunder-
bolt or Hercules’ club than a line from Homer.”
The witticism, put in Virgil’s own mouth rather than attributed to the defend-
ers of his poem, has all the brusqueness of a daring challenge, even an openly 
provocative admission. “Actually, I don’t deny that I stole. You try it, and see if 
you succeed!” As if he had said, “I alone was able to do this. I claim it as my own 
and demand your admiration.” Here is the most explicit declaration of poetic 
theory that we can desire. The intimate reasons for an artist’s method are lined 
up with proud confidence. We shall see this clearly further on.
To steal with skill should merit the same indulgence that the Spartans were said 
to grant; they punished not theft but the failure to conceal it.1 Virgil did not submit to 
being charged with an offence that he did not recognize as such; rather, he turned the 
matter around and claimed that he should be given credit: he wanted admiration for 
the exceptional artistic vigor with which he had proved that he knew how to steal the 
club from Hercules, that poetic power with which he had demonstrated that he could 
act as the patron of magisterial models so as to turn them into his personal creations.
Eliot, who probably recalled the anecdote about Virgil and his malicious 
critics from his schooldays, appropriated the bold reply of the greatest Latin poet 
and wrote with comparable brusqueness, “Immature poets imitate; mature poets 
steal; bad poets deface what they take, and good poets make it into something 
better, or at least something different. The good poet welds his theft into a whole 
of feeling which is unique, utterly different from that from which it was torn; the 
bad poet throws it into something which has no cohesion.”2
1 Plutarch Institutions of the Ancient Spartans, 237.12; Sayings of the Spartans, 234.35.
2 Eliot, Elizabethan Essays; cf. T. S. Eliot, Philip Massinger, in The Sacred Wood, essays on Poetry 
and Criticism London, Faber and Faber 1997 (1921), pp. 105–6.
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These are famous words, famous also for their bold and at one and the same 
time decisively paradoxical formulation (I sense even a touch of anti-Romantic 
impatience); Eliot must have felt himself personally implicated in the ancient 
feud over classical imitation. In fact, his pleading in defense of direct literary 
theft sounds like Cicero’s proverbial oratio pro domo sua. Eliot was really talking 
primarily about himself. He too had to answer for many lines stolen from other 
poets—so many that he reached the point of furnishing his poems with notes to 
declare his debts and borrowings openly. His detractors in their malice have insin-
uated that he hoped to cover with these explicit notices other thefts which had 
been left undeclared by himself. In just the same way, Boccaccio’s Ser Ciappel-
letto, a hardened offender, confessed only venial faults in order to conceal his 
more serious ones, and so gained sanctification. However, it is possible that Eliot, 
also a poet universally sanctified, was more innocent than Ser Ciappelletto; many 
of his reminiscences may have been unconscious and escaped his passion for 
confession—wreckage long since assimilated, and so well as to seem self-gener-
ated even to Eliot himself—self-generated, not imported from abroad. This is how 
the storehouse of memory functions, as a deposit of inert data that is still capable 
of returning to life on occasion.
Apparently Eliot is at odds with himself. As a practicing poet, he seems 
unwilling to acquire possessions without paying the bill. But when theorizing 
he exalts theft as a competitive gesture, an act of power and dexterity. When we 
reconsider, however, we understand that the two cases—that of the poet and 
that of the critic—affect each other mutually. There is no doubt that the art of a 
great poet consists in stealing with sovereign nonchalance when the opportunity 
arises, in appropriating to oneself another’s invention with the condescension of 
a patron. On the other hand, it is just as necessary for the reader to recognize what 
has been stolen so as to admire its skillful re-use; what was well placed there, is 
also well placed here. So the poet plays games with the reader lest the theft to go 
unobserved. Only when the shadow of the original text is recognizeable will the 
talent of the thieving-poet be fully appreciated by his readers.
Eliot does not hesitate to use the incriminating word “steal” to name this 
peremptory act of appropriation which best reveals the power of the mature poet. 
To lift a verse from Homer may seem to be an offence, but above all it is a feat; 
one should understand that to perform it is a difficult undertaking, more difficult 
than stealing the club from Hercules. It needs panache; it also requires courage.
In common morality, literary theft obviously met with general disapproval. 
It did not just reveal a lack of originality and betray a slack inspiration, but also 
exposed itself to the shameful accusation of plagiarism, that offence which really 
consisted either of usurping another man’s person or abusing his property, for 
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example another man’s slave.3 The essential arguments can be perceived in the 
brusque words which Cicero, as a theorist of literature, addresses in his famous 
dialogue (Brutus 76) to Ennius as an imitator of Naevius: uel sumpsisti multa, 
si fateris, uel si negas surripuisti. Here is the narrow strait in which a man who 
practices imitation finds himself. Only a frank acknowledgement can succeed 
in eluding the accusation of theft. “We can say that you have taken a lot from 
Naevius, if you are inclined to admit this, or, if you deny having done so, we must 
conclude that you stole it from him.”4 Surripere, “covert stealing,” implies not 
dexterity but fraud. This alone is why it becomes the blameworthy surrogate of an 
act of violence; it is the weak alternative to barefaced robbery .
Similar in substance, even if better articulated, is the verdict of Seneca the 
rhetorician, the critic of the first imperial generation who granted to Ovid the pos-
sibility of imitating without incurring the charge of furtum (Suas.3.7). In a verse of 
the lost tragedy Medea, the heroine apparently said feror huc illuc, uae, plena deo 
“I am driven here and there, alas, possessed by the god.” This would have been a 
phrase invented by Virgil and retrieved by Ovid, even if one cannot read plena deo 
in any surviving passage of Virgil’s works. Given that the passage seems problem-
atic, or even if we succeed in solving the question with certainty (there have been 
many attempts, and quite a few solutions proposed5), in the report transmitted 
by Seneca the Elder we are especially interested in the accompanying comment: 
Thus Ovid in imitating did what he had done for many other verses of Virgil, not with the 
aim of stealing but with the purpose of open borrowing, even wanting the Virgilian verse 
to be recognized in his own text. (Itaque fecisse illum quod in multis aliis uersibus Vergili 
fecerat, non subripiendi causa sed palam mutuandi, hoc animo ut uellet agnosci.) 
3 A recent publication of S. McGill, Plagiarism in Latin literature, Cambridge University Press 
2012, throws light on the ancient debate with an abundance of materials and much acuity of 
judgment.
4 Sit Ennius, sane, ut est certe, perfectior; qui si illum ( sc. Naeuium) ut simulate contemneret, non 
omnia bella persquens primum illud Punicum acerrimum bellum reliquisset. Sed ipse dicit cur id 
faciat :“scripsere, ‘inquit,’ alii rem vorsibus”: et luculente quidem scripserunt, etiam si minus quam 
tu polite. Nec uero tibi aliter uideri debet, qui a Naeuio uel sumpsisti multa, si fateris, uel si negas, 
subripuisti.
5 E. Berti Scholasticorum Studia, Seneca il Vecchio e la cultura  retorica e letteraria della prima età 
imperiale, (as Eduard Norden had already suggested in Vergilstudien, Vol II, p. 506, anticipated 
by Fr. Leo, De Senecae Tragoediis obseruationes criticae, Berlin, Weidmann 1878, p.  166 note 
8). This hypothesis is confirmed in the commentary of Servius in which the locution plena deo 
features as a gloss ( ad Aen. 6.50 ADFLATA EST NUMINE, nondum deo plena sed adflata uicinitate 
numinis.) See now the monumental commentary of N. Horsfall: Virgil Aeneid 6, Berlin-Boston, de 
Gruyter 2013 Vol II App. 1, pp. 627–9.
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The borrowing is public (palam): Ovid relies on his readers noticing the 
appropriation and appreciating his craft. The recognition is intended (uellet 
agnosci); not only is there no theft, but the graft would lose its effect without the 
awareness of outsiders.
Even if they do not vary much in their criteria of judgment, ancient media-
tors— grammarians, rhetoricians and commentators—always showed interest in 
the practice of literary imitation.6 Debate over the practice arose in Greece during 
the fourth century BC. The most original sayings, or at any rate the least banal, 
can be read in what is left to us of the De Imitatione of Dionysius of Halicarnas-
sus and in the first two chapters of Quintilian’s tenth book; but we will also find 
some valuable comments in the anonymous On the Sublime (13.2–4) and in the 
Controuersiae and Suasoriae of Seneca the Elder, not to mention the Saturnalia of 
Macrobius. Unfortunately the critical level attained by a large part of these works 
concerning the very common problem of imitation is collectively disappoint-
ing. Apart from some intermittent flights of insight, it is mostly a matter of bald 
judgments, too elementary and afflicted by moralizing tendencies. One can tol-
erate plagiarism with some distaste, but it always considered a product of inher-
ent weakness in the imitator. In some cases Quintilian shows an above-average 
shrewdness and even some freedom from prejudice; on the other hand, his inter-
est is fixed on the orator rather than the poet, and the orator’s chief prerequisite 
surely was not supposed to be absolute novelty of thought in language.
What discourages us in the conformist evaluations of these interpreters and 
critics is their incurable pedantry, especially if we compare them with the objec-
tive poetic excellence of the texts under judgment. Almost all of them, slaves to 
the ideology of the “first hand,” show themselves resistant to appreciating results 
of even great artistic value if they are reached “secondhand”—as if the over-val-
uation of being first-born, like a weighty handicap, necessarily robbed all artis-
tic derivatives of their value (a preconception like the one which devalued the 
“dawn” poetry of the German Romantic critics, enthusiastic admirers of every 
primitive, undetermined, unbedingte literary product).
But even in the eyes of censors the blameworthy handicap of imitatio can find 
redemption. This ransom is afforded only by the zelos, or aemulatio, of competing 
against the model. This is the only antidote known to them against the poison of 
imitation. Here is a good example: Thucydides was considered in scholastic insti-
tutions the absolute master of syntomia. Seneca the Elder (Contr. 9.1.13) quotes a 
famous saying which was falsely believed to be the historian’s own (in reality it 
came from Pseudo-Demosthenes in Epist. Phil 13, but this is unimportant to us): 
6 See the rich anthology of texts gathered by D.A. Russell and M. Winterbottom: Ancient Literary 
Criticism. The Principal texts in New Translations, Oxford, Clarendon Press 1972.
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success is extraordinarily effective in hiding and putting in the shadow each man’s mis-
takes. (δειναὶ γὰρ αἱ εύπραξίαι συγκρύψαι καὶ συσκιάσαι τὰ ἑκάστων ἁμαρτήματα)
Sallust derived one of his sayings from it (Hist. 1,55,24 “success is an incredibly 
good screen for vices”: res secundae mire sunt uitiis obtentui). The Roman histo-
rian defied Thucydides and “struck him on his own ground”: in suis illum castris 
cecidit. In fact Seneca notes that Sallust is at least more concise than his model; 
you cannot subtract a single word from the formulation of the Latin historian 
(we could say that the level of redundancy is equal to zero); everything is strictly 
necessary. But from Thucydides’ phrasing one could eliminate at least two words: 
συγκρύψαι or συσκιάσαι. A contest in brevity. In short, the best defense against 
a possible accusation of plagiarism consists in imitation which seeks to compete 
with its model, or aemulatio. If the Greeks had excelled, they could only be 
rivaled; given that perfection itself invited a challenge, the first—obligatory—step 
on this path could only be imitation. But it was also important to disqualify the 
accusation of furtum. “Roman orators, historians, and poets did not steal many 
phrases from the Greeks, but instead they challenged them” (multa oratores, his­
torici, poetae Romani a Graecis dicta non surripuerunt, sed prouocauerunt). Some-
times, however (and Seneca himself acknowledges it), the challenge ends badly 
for the imitators  “they act like thieves who switch the handles of stolen goblets to 
prevent them from being recognized” (Contr. 10.5.20). Indeed aemulatio demands 
ability; the imitator who loses the contest falls under the merciless accusation of 
plagiarism.
To put it plainly, there is a disparity in attitude between critics (grammari-
ans and commentators) on the one side, and poets on the other. The first group, 
because of their scholastic training, suffered from the prejudice that imitation 
was intrinsically a slavish act, a subordinate condition difficult to redeem—in 
short, a blunder for which one should feel embarrassment and remorse. Poets, on 
the other hand, as pupils of Mnemosyne, peacefully laid claim to the ius imitandi, 
and felt no sense of inferiority when gathering the utterances of other poets, 
whether near or far in time, renowned or obscure. They freely aspired to a shared 
inheritance, of which each man was at once creator and legitimate possessor. 
Like the anarchist Proudhon, they regarded property as nothing but theft. They 
did not claim this explicitly, but all their casual practice betrayed this convic-
tion—the opposite of that held by the critics, keen-eyed searchers documenting 
literary traits and petty thefts.
If we want to hear the opinion of a poet, let us listen to one of the greatest—
renowned not only for his intellectual originality, but also for his ability to extract 
meters and features from the rich mines of the two classical literatures. In the Ars 
Poetica Horace confronts head on the problem of artistic imitation and poetic 
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originality. In vv. 131–5, precisely because the traditional accusation of literary 
theft had long since taken on the features of a charge of illegitimacy, he puts the 
question as a point of law: 
the materials in the public domain (publica materies) will become private property (priuati 
iuris erit)—that means they will become your personal inheritance, if you do not stick to the 
circuit common and open to all, if you refuse to cling word for word to the common model 
like an attendant interpreter (nec uerbum uerbo curabis reddere fidus/ interpres); provided 
that in imitating you do not leap down into such a tight spot that shame at your incapacity 
or the rules of the genre prevent you from crawling out (nec desilies imitator in artum/ unde 
pedem proferre pudor uetet aut operis lex).
In short, the materials existing before each new literary creation—not just myths, 
but also topics, actions, poetic themes, stylistic procedures, verbal tricks and 
daring phrases—are a public heritage; they are common property and therefore 
very citizen is free to use them.
Having thus set aside the problem of legal property, Horace warns against a 
passive, inert use of the public inheritance: the materials must be reworked with 
personal energy and taste. He probably wants to condemn the low standards of 
the archaic dramatists, too submissive to Greek models to aspire to a new orig-
inality. The merit of the man who knows how to free himself through imitation 
depends entirely on the novelty of the results. Only in this way can what was 
previously a public inheritance become private property. In short, to escape sub-
jection to the models, one must always start from them, but in a spirit of competi-
tion, aiming to surpass them.7 The offence does not consist in taking from others, 
nor in imitating, but in laying down the pen before having rendered into one’s 
own personal language the language of another contained in the rich inheritance 
of the literary tradition. This is Horace’s view. And Seneca, the philosopher who 
reflected so shrewdly on the procedure of poetics, follows him, but also presses 
further. In one of his letters on a literary-artistic theme he writes without hesita-
tion:
(79.6) It makes a great difference whether you approach a subject already exhausted, or one 
which others have already tilled (multum interest utrum ad consumptam materiam an ad 
subactam accedas); the material is enriched with the passage of time, and what has been 
discovered is no obstacle to those who will discover something else again (crescit in dies et 
inuenturis inuenta non obstant). 
7 Cf. Eugenio Montale, Saturna II: « Le parole / sono di tutti e invano / si celano nei dizionari », 
in L’opera in versi, ed. critica R. Bettarini e G. Contini vol.I Le raccolte approvate, Turin, Einaudi 
1980, p. 365.
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Furthermore, the best position to occupy is that of the last writer to arrive: he 
finds the words already prepared for him, words which after rearrangement will 
acquire a new appearance (praeterea condicio optima est ultimi; parata uerba 
inuenit, quae aliter instructa nouam faciem habent). And we should not think that 
he is claiming the wealth of another poet, since this concerns public property 
(nec illis manus inicit tamquam alienis; sunt enim publica). How foreign Horace 
and Seneca seem to the narrow controversy championed by the censors of poetic 
thefts! On the hill of the Muses community of property thrives; possession is 
granted simply by use. And it is precisely use that increases the common heritage.
On another occasion (the famous Letter 84, which resembles a short trea-
tise) the philosopher again faces the problem of literary imitation with mastery; 
the imitator must digest his models to the point of deriving from them a new 
substance marked by his personal originality. “We ought to imitate bees, which 
wander and select the flowers best suited to make honey, and then dispose of 
everything they have extracted and distribute it in the combs (apes debemus 
imitari, quae uagantur et flores ad mel faciendum idoneos carpunt, deinde quiquid 
attulere disponunt ac per fauos digerunt…). §4 “We don’t really know whether they 
draw the sap from the flowers so that it turns straight into honey, or whether they 
change what they have gathered into that tasty sweetness by blending it with 
their vital breath.” (De illis non satis constat utrum sucum ex floribus ducunt qui 
protinus mel sit, an quae collegerunt in hunc saporem mixtura quadam et proprie­
tate spiritus sui mutent…): “not without adding a fermenting agent that acts on 
the varying elements by blending them into one” (non sine quodam, ut ita dicam, 
fermento quo in unum diuersa coalescent): “let us imitate the bees in this behav-
ior; … like them we should, with the aid of our diligence and talent, melt these 
different tastes into a single flavor, so that even if the source of what we have 
achieved is discovered, the result seems different from that source” (nos quoque 
has apes debemus imitari…deinde adhibita ingenii nostri cura et facultate in unum 
saporem uaria illa libamenta confundere, ut etiam si apparuerit unde sumptum sit, 
aliud tamen esse quam unde sumptum est appareat).
It is difficult to give a better description of the process of imitation and per-
sonal synthesis. Seneca does not refrain from adding (thus truly banalizing his 
first thought) another parallel: even food, digested, changes its specific and mul-
tiple nature to produce simultaneously energy and blood. We too, he concludes, 
should digest our reading (§7); otherwise, if the texts are not assimilated they 
will not produce new intellectual energies, but lie inert in the memory  (alioqui 
in memoriam ibunt, non in ingenium). The last comment proclaims, “let our mind 
act like this; let it hide everything which it has exploited and show only what it 
has had the skill to produce.” (hoc faciat animus noster; omnia quibus est adiutus 
abscondat, ipsum tamen ostendat quod effecit.) 
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The same letter contains another idea associated with the problem of imi-
tation which has enjoyed great success: Petrarch claimed it as his own and in 
Familiares XXIII 19 §78–94 expanded it into a passage of extraordinary sugges-
tive power.8 Seneca recommended (Letters 84 §8), “if some trace of resemblance 
appears in you that derives from a strong admiration deeply imposed upon you 
by the model, I want it to be the resemblance of a son to his father, not that of 
a portrait; a portrait is a dead object” (Etiam si cuius in te comparebit simili­
tudo quem admiratio tibi altius fixerit, similem esse te uolo quomodo filium, non 
quomodo imaginem; imago res mortua est). See what Petrarch has to say about 
imitating Virgil in his letter to Boccaccio (XXIII.19.11): “the man who imitates 
should concern himself with being like, not equal, to the model in what he writes, 
and this resemblance should not be that which relates the object and its image, 
which affords greater luster to the artist, but the likeness between father and son” 
(curandum imitatori ut quod scribit simile non idem sit, eamque similem talem esse 
oportere non qualis est imaginis ad eum cuius imago est, quae quo similior eo maior 
laus artificis, sed qualis filius ad patrem.) “Thus we should take care that while 
one thing is like, many things are unlike, and that very similarity stays hidden, so 
that it cannot be detected except by the silent exploration of the mind, and it can 
be guessed at rather than expressed in words.” (§ 13 sic et nobis prouidendum ut 
cum simile aliquid sit multa sint dissimilia et id ipsum simile lateat ne deprehendi 
possit nisi tacita mentis indagine, ut intellegi simile queat potiusque dici.) “So we 
should use another man’s concepts and his style but avoid his words; for while 
the first of these two manners of resemblance is hidden, the other is conspicuous; 
the former makes poets, the latter produces apes.” (utendum igitur ingenio alieno 
utendumque coloribus, abstinendum uerbis, illa enim similitudo latet, hec eminet; 
illa poetas facit, hec simias.)
Even defining clumsy imitations as “apelike” derives to some extent from 
Senecan theorizing. In letter 114.18 Seneca had humorously laid his finger on the 
weaknesses of an admirer of Sallust who was so obsessed with reproducing some 
of his more conspicuous traits that he created from them a veritable mannerism: 
“these figures of speech were rare and intermittent in Sallust, but frequent and 
almost continuous in his followers. And this is easily explained. Sallust occa-
sionally came upon such expressions, but the imitator went searching for them.” 
(quae apud Sallustium rara fuerunt, apud hunc crebra sunt et paene continua, nec 
sine causa: ille enim in haec incidebat, at hic illa quaerebat,) Quintilian agrees 
8 Cf E.H. Gombrich, Lo Stile all’ antica; imitazione ed assimilazione in Norm and form; Studies on 
the Art of the Renaissance; see also M. Bettini Tra Plinio e sant’Agostino, Francesco Petrarca sulle 
arti figurative in Memoria dell antico nell arte italiana,I, ed. S. Settis, 1 L’uso dei classici, Turin 
Einaudi 1984, pp. 233–4.
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with Seneca; even if he inculcates his exhortations with professorial aplomb, 
he also knows that imitating well is not easy: the hazards of superficiality and 
banalization weigh down upon you (10.2.15–16).: “At least those who have had 
enough critical sense to avoid the defects of their models should not be content 
with reproducing the appearance of excellence and, so to speak, only the skins, 
or rather those images that Epicurus says emanating from the surface of bodies.” 
(ne uero saltem iis quibus ad euitanda uitia iudicii satis fuit, sufficiat imaginem 
uirtutis effingere, et solam ut ita dixerim cutem uel potius illas Epicuri figuras quas 
e summis corporibus dicit effluere.) “This happens to those who, without having 
deeply scrutinized the virtues they wished to imitate, have stayed attached to the 
immediate surface of the speech.” (hoc autem illis accidit, qui non introspectis 
penitus uirtutibus ad primum se uelut aspectum orationis aptarunt.) “Even when 
imitation seems almost successful, although the results are not very different in 
words and rhythms, they don’t achieve the same expressive vigor and power of 
invention, but for the most part fall into inferior language and incur the defects 
which almost always accompany these merits; thus they become emphatic, but 
not elevated, sinewy but not concise, rash and not brave, decadent instead of 
flourishing, jerky instead of rhythmical, careless instead of straightforward.” (et 
cum illis felicissime cessit imitatio uerbis atque numeris sunt non multum diffe­
rentes, uim dicendi atque inuentionis non adsecuntur, sed plerumque declinant in 
peius et proxima uirtutibus uitia comprehendunt fiuntque pro grandibus tumidi, 
pressis exiles, fortibus temerarii, laetis corrupti, compositis exultantes, simplicibus 
negligentes.) 
Before abandoning this brief critical survey I should mention an occasional 
thought of Quintilian himself, an obiter dictum apparently negligible, but really 
deserving full attention. That the imitation of great models is the chief avenue to 
producing more excellent literature is an uncontested matter for the great teacher 
of rhetoric.9 On the other hand, it also happens that an imitator has no intention 
of imitating but does so inadvertently, recuperating a residue of buried memory 
out of unconscious attachment to his reminiscences. In short, this possibility 
too—and the most common, in my opinion— has presented itself to Quintilian’s 
critical mind and we must credit him with it. There is in fact a passage in the 
Institutio (2.7.4) which to my knowledge is unique in all ancient criticism, in which 
such a case is considered, if only for a fleeting moment. “They will always have 
within themselves models to imitate and even unconsciously they will reproduce 
the fine forms of speech that they have assimilated in the depths of their mind.” 
(semperque habebunt intra se quod imitentur, et iam non sentientes formam oratio­
nis illam, quam mente penitus acceperint, expriment.) “They will possess a great 
9 Cf. Sen. Contr. 9.3.12; Pliny Letters 1.5.2.
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abundance of chosen words, of artistic structures, of figures which they will not be 
obliged to search out, but which will offer themselves spontaneously, as if from a 
hidden treasury.” (abundabunt autem copia uerborum optimorum et compositio ne 
ac figuris iam non quaesitis, sed sponte ex reposito uelut thesauro se offerentibus.) 
The mind and spirit of every poet are an infinite reserve of inert memories and 
associations, temporarily at rest but ready to make themselves available for new 
literary creations.
* * *
But let us return to Virgil and his slanderers. It is a good rule, if we want to form 
a balanced judgment, to pay more heed to slanderers than defenders; the former 
are malicious but their hostility often offers more cause for reflection than the 
applause of the other group. While the encomiasts, misled by their own enthu-
siasm, risk preaching only their own banal admiration, the backbiters find 
themselves compelled to make arguments for their prejudices and give reason 
after reason to justify their dissent. They are miserly with praise and lavish with 
censure, but we can learn much more from their accusations than from the others. 
Certainly it takes effort to contradict them; indeed, for just this reason they force 
you to descend into matters more deeply, to explore other faces of the question, 
to work out new criteria of judgment strong enough to overthrow their adverse 
criticisms.
The most celebrated of the tribe of detractors was Zoilus, a rhetorician and 
sophist of the 4th century BC who earned himself the name of Homeromastix, 
“the lasher of Homer,” by writing a weighty work of criticism (probably entitled 
“Against the Poetry of Homer”) in which he ridiculed with rather captious argu-
ments the absurdity of certain situations in either the Iliad or the Odyssey. Vitru-
vius,  with gleeful satisfaction, assures us that the backbiter came to a horrible 
end; according to some sources he died on the cross, according to others he was 
stoned, and according to yet others he was burned alive.10 With equal satisfaction 
the Suda maintains that he paid for his bitterness at the avenging hands of the 
citizens of Olympia, who were indignant at his burning spitefulness. His cursed 
tongue had brazenly pricked not just the divine Homer but also great contempo-
rary writers like Plato and Isocrates; obviously he did not inconvenience himself 
for small matters but attacked only the highest peaks. He was an opponent who 
practiced contrariety in method and system; in fact he not only dared to dislodge 
the poet whom everyone considered the genial inspiration of all literature, but on 
top of that he actually wrote an encomium of Polyphemus.
10 De Architectura, Praef. VII, 8–9.
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So there was cause to expect that immediately after the publication of the 
Aeneid, the poem that made Virgil into the Latin Homer, some detractor would 
leap up, ready to discredit the new masterwork. Carvilius Pictor, if we are to 
believe the notices in Virgil’s biographers, took inspiration from the Homeroma­
stix to write his Aeneomastix; earlier a man called Numitor had disgorged all his 
intolerance in a stupid pamphlet with the transparent title of Antibucolica. The 
malevolence of some Virgilian critics need not concern us further; whether it 
was caused by jealousy or the foolish passion for “cutting the lion’s claws,” it 
seems a normal reaction to the enormous success which Virgil’s poetry provoked 
immediately from the Roman people. What interests us more is that the detrac-
tors realized so easily that the new works paradoxically achieved their originality 
by imitating Theocritus with the aim of creating a substantially different bucolic 
poetry; imitating Hesiod with the goal of writing a new didactic poetry, and finally 
imitating Homer in order to produce an epic entirely Roman in both spirit and 
language. What provoked the detractors, apart from the ambitious nature of the 
proposal, was a disconcerting aporia: the path followed was that of imitation but 
the results appeared overwhelmingly new. Originality, in fact, was reached by an 
unexpected detour. If I am allowed a play on words, originality was attained by a 
return to the very origins of poetry. For hostile critics imitation was a slavish prac-
tice, and the recognizability of the model simply entailed the charge of furtum. 
Already a few decades after the death of Virgil the learned scholar Asconius Pedi-
anus found himself compelled to take up the poet’s defence with a book entitled 
“Against the detractors of Virgil.” But the scholastic dispute had been sufficiently 
kindled and only died out after considerable time.
In fact its traces can be found more than three centuries afterward, even 
though they had long since been trampled. In his Saturnalia Macrobius presents 
a number of learned Romans and Greeks discussing Virgil’s poetry; together they 
all give voice to an unreserved encomium of the maximus poetarum but among 
them (they are all important historic figures) there is a fictitious contradictor, 
coarse and petulant, Evangelus, who with his malicious interruptions personi-
fies the long sequence of past detractors. It is these fellows whom Rufus Albinus 
has in mind when in Saturnalia VI.1.2 he says “while I want to show the profit that 
our Virgil extorted from reading his predecessors, whether the flowers he plucked 
from them all or the ornaments he selected from various authors to embellish 
his poetry, I am afraid of offering malicious or incompetent persons the cue to 
criticize him. They could in fact have accused such a great poet of plagiarism, not 
taking into consideration that the advantage produced from his reading consists 
precisely in his seeking to match what is approved in others and opportunely 
turning to his own use whatever stimulates the most admiration in their works. 
This is what our Roman writers—indeed, even the best of them—have often done, 
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either by imitating each other, or by imitating the best of the Greeks, who were 
also imitating each other.” (et quos ex omnibus flores uel quae in carminis sui 
decorem ex diuersis ornamenta libauerit, occasionem reprehendendi uel imperitis 
uel malignis ministrem, exprobrantibus tanto uiro alieni usurpationem nec con­
siderantibus hunc esse fructum legendi, aemulari ea quae in aliis probes, et quae 
maxime inter aliorum dicta mireris in aliquem usum tuum oportuna deriuatione 
conuertere; quod et nostri tam inter se quam a Graecis et Graecorum excellentes 
inter se saepe fecerunt.)
Here is the treachery that was being denounced, the deadly treachery that 
entailed the charge of furtum. Rufius Albinus then concentrated his efforts on 
showing how very different from each other the two texts, the original and its 
transformation, came to be in the end (Saturnalia VI.2.1): “after having examined 
the verses taken partly or wholly from others, or even, so to speak dipped in a dif-
ferent dye, thanks to the modification of certain words, I now intend to compare 
the passages; you will be able to recognize the origin of their formation as if they 
were reflected in a mirror.” (post uersus ab aliis uel ex integro uel ex parte trans­
latos, uel quaedam immutando uerba tamquam fuco alio tinctos, nunc locos locis 
componere sedet animo, ut unde formati sint quasi de speculo cognoscas.)
But the same critic, Albinus, had made his most resolute pronouncement 
at the opening of his contribution—an enthusiastic judgment which definitively 
transcended the narrow terms of the ancient polemic on furta (VI.1.6): “Finally his 
own good taste in transferring and his art of imitation achieved this result: that 
what harks back to others in his works we readers either simply prefer to consider 
as the fruit of his invention or we note in amazement that it sounds better there 
than in the original passage.” (Denique et iudicio transferendi et modo imitandi 
consecutus est, ut quod apud illum legerimus alienum aut illius esse malimus aut 
melius hic quam ubi natum est sonare miremur). Note that the decisive step has 
been taken; we simply prefer to believe that the imitation is the product of his 
own imagination. Appropriation has produced a new kind of property. We might 
even say the plunderer has discovered how to improve on his spoils. Not only 
does the dexterity of the imitator legitimize the theft, but the model, artistically 
transformed, seems actually to gain in poetic force. The man who steals Hercules’ 
club ends up becoming stronger than Hercules.
In the name of an exercise in argumentation we might state two principles, 
both true in themselves but opposed to each other. The first says, “There is no 
originality, at least in the sense that nothing can be primal, absolutely immune 
from previous experience; by force of nature every artifact is to some extent the 
product of imitation, recovery or development of previous material.” The anti-
thetical principle declares, “There is no imitation, at least in the sense that the 
prius dictum reappears every time in new contexts and hence comes to take on 
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new functions and new implications; this excludes the possibility of imitation 
(understood as an inert repurposing of alien elements).” I am not risking myself 
in the labyrinth of aporia, I am only trying to justify affirmations like this: “Virgil 
is completely different from Homer, although it is true that he imitates him.” Or 
even like this other more conclusive claim: “This phrase of Virgil is not Homer 
imitated, it is Homer transformed.” That means we find ourselves before a Homer 
who is no longer Homer, like coral that has coagulated from blood vomited by 
the petrifying head of Medusa, just as laurel was formerly the sinuous body of 
the nymph Daphne, but is now a tree with branches and leaves. Then we must 
ask ourselves, Does the process of metamorphosis itself participate in imitation? 
Can we say that the second stage “imitates” the primary stage, the one destined 
to disappear? The stones of Deucalion and Pyrrha had veins in which, after the 
miracle of regeneration, the living blood of men and women began to flow, but 
now they are no longer the flinty “bones of the great mother earth.” The “after” 
virtually coexists with the “before.” The economy of metamorphosis requires the 
new forms to recycle as far as possible the materials of the old ones. Sometimes 
metamorphosis is seen as a fusion of two bodies, and not just as a transformation 
of one into the other; thus in Metamorphoses (4.378–9) Ovid relates of Salmacis 
and Hermaphroditus nec duo sunt, sed forma duplex, “and they are no longer two 
individuals but a single double shape.” This is the androgyne. With rationalistic 
insistence the poet then specifies: neutrumque et utrumque uidetur “it has the 
appearance of neither but at the same time has the appearance of each.”
I believe this is the best possible definition of the process of artistic trans-
formation: in it not only the presence of resemblances but also their absence is 
valorized. The new structure is no longer the previous one, but in a certain sense 
it still is. In the double shape, the resemblances may predominate (and then this 
will be imitation), or the differences will predominate (and then it is not permit-
ted to talk of imitation). The oscillating dialectic between “before” and “after,” 
the old and the new, is the compulsory path of creative activity. Even the absolute 
originality of the Creator chose to make man in his own image and likeness. This 
was an act of imitation.
My generation learnt from the structuralist studies undertaken in linguistic 
circles (but we sort of knew it already, as I will say in the second chapter) that 
every discourse is constructed as a system of differences. It is the very differences 
which, once coherently organized, produce sense. Virgil’s work, as Macrobius 
rightly notes (Saturnalia V.2.130), is like a mirror of the poems of Homer: opus 
Vergilianum uelut de quodam Homerici operis speculo formatum est. A new image 
springs from it which is now the fruit of condensation, now of amplification, now 
the result of an inversion, now of a combination, and now simply a silent presup-
position; it is the differences that create the new sense. Virgil’s act is a genuine act 
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of “occupation” of the Homeric text, and I am referring to the particular method 
of acquiring property which the code of private law regularly acknowledges. For 
the poet of the Aeneid, the dialectic of appropriation requires the new possessor 
to show enough modesty to put on the outer clothing of the imitator and cloak his 
real ambitions. As if Virgil by this gesture wanted nothing more than to make men 
believe that the Aeneid is nothing but the third poem of Homer, but in the end 
revealed his immodest purpose: to evict Homer, and displace him. 
Certainly Homer is still the undying source of poetry, the inexhaustible rep-
ertory of all literature past and present, but he has also become a monument 
to approach with reverence; he is marvelous and intangible. The Greek poets, 
Alexandrian and Roman, could also cite him and pay him respectful homage; 
from him they could derive momentum and suggestions, embedding in their own 
texts some of his lapidary phrases or some evocative epithet; his own canonized 
authority still made him a permanent fixture, equal to himself alone. Such abso-
lute authority is the only characteristic of Homer which Virgil wanted to leave 
untouched; indeed, he wanted to reconfirm it in all its might. He drew on it to 
make himself a patron of that archetypal atmosphere that is the incomparable 
guarantee of the new poem. But his operating strategy has an entirely opposite 
purpose: he is aiming to detach Homer from his intangibility and its monumen-
tally imposing nature. He dismembers Homer’s books, disorders his sequences 
and episodes at the level of individual verses, deconstructs the narrative struc-
tures—and then freely reconstructs them. The Odyssey with the wanderings 
endured by its hero will become the palimpsest of the first part of the Aeneid; the 
Iliad with its battles and glorious victims will in its turn disappear beneath the 
war endured by Aeneas on Italian soil.
An allegorical-philosophical narrative, a myth that arose about Dionysus 
(Olympiodorus, Commentary on Phaedo 67.c; Proclus, Commentary on Timaeus 
33b), tells how the infant god while playing with a looking-glass broke it into many 
pieces and these individual fragments gave birth to the variety of things in the 
world. Thus Homer acts as a looking-glass for Virgil, but he is a glass whose frag-
ments recombine themselves into a work that intends to be completely different. 
What Virgil actually intends is an eminently modern result. It is this very moder-
nity—the idea that Rome is ready for a cultural and political renewal—which is 
the urgent objective of the entire Augustan renaissance. The many centuries that 
elapsed between the composition of the Iliad and the Odyssey had modernized 
Homer in successive stages, each time for different tastes: the great Attic tragedi-
ans had drawn material and inspiration from the Trojan cycle (“crumbs” from the 
banquet of Homer), deepening the expanse of grief within which the heroes of 
myth had acted; philosophical speculation had reconsidered the exemplarity of 
Homeric culture and reconceived it to match the demands of the present; the Hel-
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lenistic poets had “de-objectified” the Homeric world by lyricizing it and dyeing 
it with their subjectivism—a continuous process of modernization of which Virgil 
had acquired an extraordinary knowledge and a perfect awareness.
So we might say that Virgil had two Homers in front of him: the original poet, 
untouched and fabulous, and the poet as he had been received, continuously 
revisited and variously reinterpreted in more or less recent literary experiments. 
Virgil shows signs of wanting to become the patron in particular of the first of 
these two Homers. We have already said this: Virgil’s originality consists of his 
unforeseeable return to his origins. Thus, just as his act of appropriation con-
structs itself paradoxically by starting from the slavish act of artistic imitation, 
so too the most ancient Homer is paradoxically summoned to provide the exter-
nal configuration of Virgilian modernity, the genetic form in which to inscribe 
contemporaneity. Transplanted into the Augustan age by a poet who is inventing 
the new values—new also to the Roman community for whom the Aeneid was 
destined—Homer brings as his dowry the incomparable fascination of his remote 
world; but it is also true that as a consequence of the expropriation carried out 
by Virgil, Homer himself emerges strengthened and regains in full his own func-
tion as a model for elevated poetry. His outer forms will be penetrated by a com-
pletely new sensibility, which runs clandestinely through his text while giving the 
impression of not violating it. Even the new poetic substance which I shall call 
“the internal form” of the Aeneid and of its personages will bow to demonstrate 
a respectful acceptance of these external forms and a fervent adhesion to them. 
This is how the proposal of a new heroism, thoughtful and civilized, can impose 
itself surreptitiously while finding a warrant and precedent in the heroism of the 
mythical age. Each item lifted in the theft will seem to recall Homer openly, but 
the whole will be much more than the sum of its individual parts. Even if Aeneas 
inherits and accumulates singular features of Odysseus, Achilles and Hector, his 
profile will be that of a hero who embodies a culture long since foreign, a culture 
in the process of completion. The dialectic which binds the Book of the Greek 
world to the new scripture of the Latin community, while it disguises as the right 
of succession what is really a thieving appropriation, sets in motion a close com-
parison between the myth of Greek origins and actual Roman history. We might 
say that Homer himself, transplanted into the Augustan renaissance, is called up 
to rewrite his poems in person, but using the hand, mind and heart of Virgil. The 
agonistic quality of the relationship that binds Roman Virgil to Homer, a direct 
relationship between equals, will never find full expression.
Certainly—and this is a component of Virgil’s poetic experience which must 
always be vigorously reaffirmed—there would never have been an Aeneid without 
the evocative grieving of Attic tragedy or the subjectivising manner of Hellenistic 
epic. Virgil, the mature pupil of Alexandrian poetry, has drawn on all his debts: 
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the loans and quotations and recoveries, the chance impulses and occasional 
insertions come from the entire (and I mean entire) Greek and Roman literary 
tradition (it will be Ennius first and foremost, but also Lucretius and Catullus 
who face us so often in the verses of the Aeneid). Virgil’s learning, his prodigious 
literary memory, is a lavish treasury which at every moment of composition duti-
fully expands canonical motifs and forms of diction. It is a well equipped larder 
waiting only to contribute actively to the formation of a new text. 
But for Virgil Homer is not just one among many poetic models to imitate; he 
is quite different from a persistent return of memory. His role is completely privi-
leged, absolutely unique. This essential aspect has not always been appreciated 
in its full scope, neither by the criticism of the ancients nor that of the moderns. 
We must come to understand that Homer is nothing less than the very matrix of 
the external form of the Aeneid, natura naturans, as Spinoza would say. His pres-
ence is immanent in the Virgilian text, a presence injected as a potentiality of the 
new writing—it is the “mother and nurse” of narrative inventions and the grand 
style. For this reason Virgil follows the lofty model from close at hand, and for the 
same reason he so often releases himself from it: both are obligatory measures for 
the man who has decided to turn the work of Homer into his own chosen venue, 
but who also wants his new text to be a marked counterpoint to it.
Thus the Aeneid is enlivened with a wise polyphony, thanks to which, accord-
ing to two distinctive melodic designs, imitation and originality blend at every 
step into a play of consonance and dissonance. Homer’s work is the counterpart 
of Hercules’ club, of a thunderbolt stolen from Zeus; we intuit here and there in 
the Virgilian text the pride of the plunderer. But beside it there is also clearly 
visible the reassuring pleasure of genealogical affiliation: “this is my inheritance 
because I have taken possession of it , but with me the inheritance does not leave 
the circle of the family.” The new epic text strips bare the old, but does not elim-
inate it; it turns it into the horizon within which it can safely move, or better, it 
makes it the necessary interlocutor in a close and equalised debate. Interdiscur-
sivity (the term which Cesare Segre prefers in some cases to intertextuality) does 
not propose a mere contest of strength between imitator and imitated, as there 
would be if everything was reduced to simple emulation; rather it establishes a 
dialogue, an exchange of thought between two voices, a continuous confronta-
tion between juxtaposed forms and languages.
An example of the skill with which Virgil first steals the skeleton of the 
Homeric text and then stretches and transforms it from within can express more 
than any number of generalizations. In the Iliad, book XVI is entirely dedicated 
to the aristeia of Patroclus. The valiant companion of Achilles triumphs victori-
ously on the field of battle, killing many Trojan warriors before he is felled by the 
weapons of Hector (who thus seals his own destiny, to die at the hands of Achil-
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les as avenger). To stop Patroclus, Sarpedon, son of Zeus and Laodamia, bravely 
confronts him. As king of the Lycians, Sarpedon is fighting alongside the allies in 
the attack on the Greek wall. When Patroclus and Sarpedon are on the point of 
combat the scene shifts to Olympus. Zeus, moved to pity by the grievous action 
which he has been witnessing, turns to his wife Hera (433 ff):
Alas! Sarpedon, dearest of men to me, it is his destiny to be killed by Patroclus, son of 
Menoetius. My heart is split in two while I doubt within whether I should swoop down to 
seize him alive from the struggling battle and put him in safety in the fertile land of Lycia, or 
cause his death at the hand of the son of Menoetius.
ὤ μοι ἐγών, ὅ τέ μοι Σαρπηδόνα, φίλτατον ἀνδρῶν,
μοῖρ᾽ ὑπὸ Πατρόκλοιο Μενοιτιάδαο δαμῆναι.
διχθὰ δέ μοι κραδίη μέμονε φρεσὶν ὁρμαίνοντι,
ἤ μιν ζωὸν ἐόντα μάχης ἄπο δακρυοέσσης
θείω ἀναρπάξας Λυκίης ἐν πίονι δήμωι,
ἦ ἤδη ὑπὸ χερσὶ Μενοιτιάδαο δαμάσσω.
Hera opposes him, and in any case she is not too inclined to aid Zeus’ adulter-
ously begotten son (440 ff.):
Dread son of Cronos, what an outrageous thing you have said! You want to withdraw a 
man who is mortal, marked long since for his destiny, from his cruel death? Do it then, but 
surely all of us other gods do not give our approval. And I will tell you another thing, and 
you must plant it in your mind. If you send Sarpedon alive to his home, take care that some 
other god will not want to send his dear son far from the vicious battle; indeed, many sons 
of immortals are fighting around the great city of Priam. And you will create a tremendous 
rage among them.
αἰνότατε Κρονίδη, ποῖον τὸν μῦθον ἔειπες.
ἄνδρα θνητὸν ἐόντα, πάλαι πεπρωμένον αἴσηι,
ἂψ ἐθέλεις θανάτοιο δυσηχέος ἐξαναλῦσαι;
ἕρδ᾽· ἀτὰρ οὔ τοι πάντες ἐπαινέομεν θεοὶ ἄλλοι.
ἄλλο δέ τοι ἐρέω, σὺ δ᾽ ἐνὶ φρεσὶ βάλλεο σῆισιν·
ἄι κε ζὼν πέμψηις Σαρπηδόνα ὅνδε δόμονδε,
φράζεο μή τις ἔπειτα θεῶν ἐθέληισι καὶ ἄλλος
πέμπειν ὃν φίλον υἱὸν ἀπὸ κρατερῆς ὑσμίνης·
πολλοὶ γὰρ περὶ ἄστυ μέγα Πριάμοιο μάχονται
υἱέες ἀθανάτων,  τοῖσιν κότον αἰνὸν ἐνήσεις.
Then Hera advises him to let Sarpedon die in combat, but in compensation she 
asks Zeus to send Death and Sleep to transport his corpse to the land of Lycia for 
the funeral ceremonies: “this is actually the privilege of the dead” and “the father 
of gods and men does not disobey (οὐδ᾽ ἀπίθησε) but sheds drops of blood on 
the earth (αἱματοέσσας … ψιάδας) to honour his son, whom Patroclus was about 
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to kill on the fertile soil of Troy far from his country.” This is not one of the most 
conspicuous episodes in the action of the Iliad; it resumes the aristeia of Patro-
clus and, even if it stands out among the many killings of the sixteenth book 
it is marginal with respect to the overall action of the poem. But Virgil rips the 
scene from its Homeric context and loads it with important structural functions in 
the economy of the Aeneid, and he makes it a pivotal point.11 The transformation 
of Homer is absolutely radical. In Virgil’s tenth book—“the book of unbalanced 
duels,” in which Pallas confronts Turnus, and Lausus confronts Aeneas—the 
young prince of the Arcadians, entrusted by his father Evander to the guardian-
ship of Aeneas, fights heroically against the Rutuli, laying many of them low until 
Turnus seeks him out, finds him and with odiously cruel joy, challenges him. The 
lad Pallas, a novice warrior on his first day of battle, does not flinch at the duel 
and even replies to the threats of his enraged enemy with heroic pride. Before 
hurling his lance he addresses a prayer to his sacred protector, Hercules Hospes.12 
But Hercules, in the celestial abode of the gods, shirks the request and groaning 
with grief, sheds tears of impotence (10.464 ff.):
Alcides hears the young man and smothers a mighty groan deep in his heart, shedding 
futile tears. Then his father Jove turns to his son with affectionate words. “For each man his 
day is determined, short and irrevocable and for all their life is fixed; but to prolong one’s 
glory with feats, that is the task of valour. Beneath the lofty walls of Troy so many sons of 
gods fell, and Sarpedon my son fell with them. Destiny summons even Turnus and he has 
long since reached the endpoint of life assigned to him.” So he spoke and removed his sight 
from the lands of the Rutuli.
Audiit Alcides iuuenem magnumque sub imo
corde premit gemitum lacrimasque effundit inanis.
Tum genitor natum dictis adfatur amicis:
“stat sua cuique dies, breue et inreparabile tempus
omnibus est vitae; sed famam extendere factis
hoc uirtutis opus. Troiae sub moenibus altis
tot gnati cecidere deum; quin occidit una
Sarpedon, mea progenies; etiam sua Turnum
fata uocant, metasque dati peruenit ad aeui.” 
Sic ait atque oculos Rutulorum reicit aruis.
11 A. Barchiesi offers a rich and finely articulated analysis of the two passages, Homeric and 
Virgilian, in La Traccia del Modello, Effetti Homerici nella narrazione Virgiliana, Pisa, Giardini 
1984 (“Biblioteca of Materiali e discussioni per l’analisi dei testi classici” = MD I), pp. 11–54. See 
also the excellent Die Aeneis und Homer. Studien zur poetischen Technik Vergils mit Listen der 
Homerzitate in der Aeneis, “Hypomnemata 7”, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1964.
12 Hercules, as Virgil has explained in book 8, was the guest of Pallas’s father Evander and so 
owed him an act of reciprocal hospitality.
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At this point the unstoppable sequence of fatal events is set in motion. Turnus, 
the “primitive” hero, substantially Homeric, and so foreign to the new cultural 
sensibility of which Aeneas is (still half unconsciously) the bearer, will kill young 
Pallas and without any respect for his weakness vulnerability will strip him of 
his myth-laden baldric as a trophy of war. It is a cursed trophy, and the wrench-
ing sight of it at the end of the poem will provoke Aeneas to take vengeance on 
Turnus. Thus the death of Pallas becomes the turning point, the critical moment, 
the point of change, in the second part of the Aeneid. But beyond this decisive 
function which the divine intermezzo comes to acquire in Virgil’s narrative strat-
egy, there is much more in the transformation of the Homeric model. We are 
facing a new theology, and a new ethics outlines itself; Homer is left behind. 
If the proper skill of great poetry is to create necessities and expectations 
which it is unable to satisfy even at the actual moment, the Aeneid too in working 
out this scene succeeds in making us feel the approach of a different world—
indeed, it announces ambitiously that it has arrived. Readers cannot fail to be 
aware of it. Virgil recalls the episode of the death of Sarpedon absolutely explic-
itly, as if Jupiter in the Aeneid openly wanted to disavow himself, or better the 
Zeus that he once was and should no longer be. And to do this with full clarity, 
Jupiter cites himself, or better the text of Homer: quin occidit una / Sarpedon, mea 
progenies. The Roman reader of the Aeneid knows all about the death of Sarpe-
don and Zeus’s tortured doubts and Hera’s opportunistic protests, but Virgil puts 
this episode perforce before his eyes, because comparison of the two texts makes 
evident the changes that have been worked, thereby inviting judgment upon the 
Homeric model. In Homer Zeus, even as the most powerful father of the gods, 
shows himself vulnerable to human passion, suffers and reacts without self-con-
trol; he is not impartial and even blunders in inconvenient favoritism; he would 
be inclined to break the unmovable moira of death already determined for Sarpe-
don. Hera seems more pragmatic but her political realism is only an everyday 
bit of common sense. Virgil disassembles the scene and freely recomposes its 
constitutive parts: he changes (even reverses) the functions of the roles, creating 
a grandiose spectacle of theological sublimity and calm dignity. The role of the 
antagonist is anticipated, and given to Hercules, the deified hero who, in keeping 
with his mortal origin, is still open to compassion. However, he succeeds in con-
trolling his manifestations of mourning. Jupiter takes on the “rationalistic” role 
that had belonged to Hera, but gives to her words, final and conclusive, a lapidary 
tone of incontrovertible truth: she is the interpreter and executor of the absolute 
necessity of fate. 
The stoicization of Jupiter is part of the ideological system constructed by 
the Aeneid. The greatest of the gods puts on his full royal nature, and with it also 
receives the nobility of grauitas and, above all, Roman decorum—the law of the 
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universe that cannot be violated by the caprices of any being. What is left to men is 
uirtus: to prolong, according to each man’s strength, the shortness of life. Homer 
must bow before the rules of imitation; he must have his verses stolen in order 
to see them once again capable of creating an ideal world, a new morality, a new 
form of living, more civil and more modern, but always heroic, as the life offered 
by Homer in person so many centuries before had been. In short: to compose de 
quodam Homerici operis speculo is an act not of imitative subjection but rather of 
revitalizing antiquity, and at the same time an act from which the legitimacy and 
relative autonomy of the present emerge as exalted. 
While the dialogue with Homer (we can resort to Segre and with misconceived 
philological technicism call it “interdiscursivity”) offers to Vergil, the modern 
interlocutor, an institutional guarantee, but the dialogue only supplies the form 
of questions asked. The answers will have a completely new tone.
Manet must have felt himself moved by a similar claim to modernity, out of 
a comparable peremptory need for cultural and artistic renewal, when in the 
mid-nineteenth century he made the provocative choice of Titian’s Venus of Urbino 
as the model for his Olympia: a reworking that imposed a disruptive comparison 
between two different languages, between two opposing forms of the world.13 It 
is an antiphrastic quotation, a quotation aiming to invert the significance of the 
model: philologists of the last century would have called the procedure oppositio 
in imitando. Manet persistently imitates the pose of Titian’s goddess, reproducing 
almost identically the mattress, the folded sheet and the curtain at the rear. Tit-
ian’s painting, commissioned as a wedding present and intended as an edifying 
example for the very young bride of the Duke of Urbino, should have celebrated 
the loving union in an allegorical form, a triumph of eroticism made chaste and 
reduced by its domestic setting. At the feet of the naked Venus a little dog is nest-
ling, a symbol of marital fidelity; the goddess of love promises seduction and sen-
suality, but only as favours granted to the legitimate bridegroom.
In Manet’s picture the display of fidelity to Titian’s model makes us realize all 
the better the distortion of its significant features, in fact their inversion. Olympia 
13 The dialogue between Manet and Titian and the emotionally provocative contrast of Olym­
pia with the Venus of Urbino was suggested in the splendid exhibition Manet. Return to Ven­
ice mounted in the Doge’s palace in Venice (24 April to 18 August 2013); it was conceived and 
planned by Gabriella Belli and Guy Cogeval (the catalogue was edited by Stephane Guegan, 
Geneva-Milan, Skirà, 2013). On the theme of the appropriation of the Titianic model achieved 
by Manet, I also remember the pages of Daniel Arasse La donna del cassone, now also found 
in Non si vede niente, Descrizioni Turin, Einaudi 2013, pp. 99–131, especially p. 102: “if art has 
had a history and continues to have one, it is only thanks to the work of the artists, and, among 
other things, thanks to their attention to the works of the past, and the way in which they have 
appropriated those works.”
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represents a femme de plaisir who seems to challenge the observer (a potential 
client?) with her shameless gaze; the flower in her hair and the ribbon collar of 
black satin are patches of colour, but also signs of everyday life bereft of allegor-
ical abstraction. The willfully contemptuous pose, the left hand pressing on the 
womb (more to stress it than to hide it), and the slippers set out at her feet create a 
realistic atmosphere of worldliness, completely antithetical to the mythical subli-
mation that surrounds Titian’s Venus. Titian’s nurse, the goddess’s faithful atten-
dant, becomes in Manet a black servant who, like a procuress, passes a bouquet 
of roses to her mistress—a gallant tribute, one imagines, from some panting client 
kept waiting. The puppy crouched at the end of the bed is replaced by a black cat, 
conveying a quite different symbolic load. The warm and spreading colours of the 
renaissance Venus give place to a chromatic and luministic contrast, which also 
enters into the determined modernizing of Manet’s great model: in fact, the ambi-
guity of tonal passages of white on white and black on black make it a provocative 
exercise in stylistic virtuosity. Not only the immorality of the subject but above 
all the innovative pictorial technique scandalized the Parisian public. Manet 
defended himself by claiming that his imitation intended to update the Venus of 
Urbino, and Zola wanted to intervene on his side with an exculpatory pamphlet.
This is the point. Modernizing the model inevitably demanded that it should 
be “actualized.” The imitator retrieves another man’s design but must inevitably 
bestow on it meaning and values that are in harmony with his own sensibility. 
In fact, uprooted from their context, the elements preserved through imitation 
enter into another context, where they gain a new originality, whether of sense 
or of style. There is a verse of Homer which I have quoted several times in my 
past essays, for different purposes then, and I would like to excuse myself for 
resorting to it once more: πεντήκοντα ἔνεσαν θάλαμοι ξεστοῖο λίθοιο “there were 
fifty chambers wrought in well smoothed stone” (Iliad 6.244). It seems to me it 
can be useful here as an example of the way in which Virgil, as a modern poet, 
succeeds in stealing from Homer and at the same time imprinting on his theft 
the brand of his own unmistakable originality. In the Aeneid, at the heart of the 
narrative of the last night of Troy, in the midst of the raging slaughter Aeneas 
witnesses the assault on the palace of Priam, and the bridal chambers of the old 
king’s daughters are revealed to his eyes: Aen. 2.503 quinquaginta illi thalami, 
spes tanta nepotum. Virgil’s phrase is not just an open allusion, not just a quota-
tion of Homer’s words, but a transliteration—we call it a calc in the Latin tongue—
of the same Greek sounds that had formed the first part of the verse in Homer: 
πεντήκοντα ἔνεσαν θάλαμοι ~ quinquaginta illi thalami. Up to the caesura of the 
verse, lexicon, sound and rhythm are practically identical, and it seems to the 
reader that he is hearing the reverberation of an echo; Homer lends his own voice 
to Virgil. But in the second half of the verse Homer writes ξεστοῖο λίθοιο, “of well 
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smoothed stone.” Virgil is utterly different: spes tanta nepotum, “so great a hope 
of grand children.” 
What began as an architectural detail, impersonal and refined in its objec-
tive physicality, now becomes a most lamentable note, a sympathetic and bit-
terly subjective intrusion, in which the modern poetics (sentimentalisch, as the 
German Romantics would have called it) that the poet has chosen are concen-
trated. The loss here is not just a deviation from the model, but rather a change 
of register, a leap from one system of reference to another. The extremely close 
contact that the two lines maintain with each other in their first half makes clear 
the painstaking nature of the harmonization achieved by the Virgilian imitation: 
the more the new text clings to Homer (and it could not do so more closely), the 
more the new voice re-echoes from it, modern and full of grief, reflexive and full 
of pathetic subjectivity. The dialogue between the two texts brings out all that 
Virgil has learned from Homer, but also everything that he himself wants to teach.
That imitation is also a form of challenge has long been obvious. But we 
are not saying that the challenger always wants to defeat the one he challenges. 
Indeed, most of the time he wants only the privilege of being able to measure 
himself against his rival, in a contest with two victors. The challenger is looking 
for recognition; his greatest ambition is to be able to reach parity with his prede-
cessor, while preserving the proper differences.
Parody is utterly different in its intentions; it imitates but only to sabotage, to 
cheapen; in fact it is simply the parasitic form of imitation, submitting itself pas-
sively to the model, and limiting itself to caricature; in a word, it pretends rather 
than imitates. The motive of the parodist is quite the opposite of admiration, 
given that parody refuses to appropriate the text but burlesques it in a travesty. 
Sometimes its playfulness amounts to gentle teasing, and it can assume the guise 
of a complimentary pastiche; on other occasions it amuses itself by counterfeit-
ing in a buffoonish fashion a “mannerism” or a conspicuous expressive feature. 
Parody is always malicious, when it is not outright spiteful: its most elementary 
technique consists in recasting as defects the very features which embody the 
artistic merits of a text or its most characteristic themes. Its weakness consists 
in its “vampire-like” behaviour; not being self-sufficient, it needs distinguished 
models in order to live at their expense, and for this reason exploits only traits 
that are easily recognizable because they are sanctified in the collective memory. 
Its (inevitable) failure consists of the increase in notoriety, and even authority, 
which it ends up conferring despite itself on the parodied text.
I mentioned parody because in spite of its different if not utterly opposed 
aims, the art of imitation shares with it some procedures in its intrusion upon 
the original. But one must consider that the imitator enjoys a freedom of action 
infinitely greater than the parodist; the imitator can transplant his model, 
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or even cut it back or transform it, or at any rate tailor it to his own context. I 
stressed a moment ago a relevant feature of Virgil’s poetic form, that most care-
fully observed sense of the dignity of representation which is also a propriety of 
language: decorum, the prepon dear to Hellenistic poetics. Such necessary obser-
vance of decorum is a reflex, or better a complementary factor of sublimity, of the 
hypselon which constitutes the dominant tone of the Aeneid. Properly speaking, 
its action operates “in the negative” inasmuch as it hampers from entering the 
text any form of either content or expression that tends to mutilate heroic dignity. 
In short, the actualization of models requires that they submit themselves to the 
restrictive rules which inspire the Roman poem. But the choice of the sublime is 
for Virgil both an ethical and aesthetic choice: it is not just a rejection of every low 
or shabby feature, but rather the attentive construction of a diffuse atmosphere of 
grandeur. Hence a strong pathos which impregnates the representation of heroic 
suffering: human grief is compensated by the virtue of endurance and a firm 
resolve of the mind. The humble things of daily life stay outside this horizon. In 
the Homeric narrative, things, objects, la vita nella totalità quotidiana, crowded 
the scene continually, filling it with plain and realistic details—it happened this 
way whether in the world of men or that of the gods; hence the representation of 
the miraculous and the divine was not exempt from material and concrete ele-
ments. In the Aeneid, on the contrary, the filter of decorum only lets through those 
aspects of the model that do not risk compromising the sublime.
A good example is provided by the contrast between two closely related 
scenes. In Iliad 18.369 ff. Thetis goes to Hephaestus to get the divine blacksmith 
to forge new weapons for her son Achilles, who has to return to battle.
And she found him turning and sweating among the bellows and busying around. . . . [410] 
He spoke, and panting the cripple raised himself from the bellows; limping, his thin legs 
trudged, and he put the bellows aside far from the forge, and gathered the instruments that 
he was using in a silver container; he wiped his face and both hands with a sponge, and his 
sturdy neck and hairy skin; he put on a tunic, took up a big stick and came out, limping…
Τὸν δ᾽ εὖρ᾽ ἱδρώοντα ἑλισσόμενον περὶ φύσας
σπεύδοντα ...
............................................................................
Ἦ, καὶ ἀπ᾽ ἀκμοθέτοιο πέλωρ αἴητον ἀνέστη
χωλεύων· ὑπὸ δὲ κνῆμαι ῥώοντο ἀραιαί.
Φύσας μέν ῥ᾽ ἀπάνευθε τίθει πυρός, ὅπλα τε πάντα
λάρνακ᾽  ἐς ἀργυρέην συλλέξατο, τοῖς ἐπονεῖτο·
σπόγγωι δ᾽ ἀμφὶ πρόσωπα καὶ ἄμφω χεῖρ᾽ ἀπομόργνυ
αὐχένα τε στιβαρὸν καὶ στήθεα λαχνήεντα,
δῦ δὲ χιτῶν᾽, ἕλε δὲ σκῆπρον παχύ, βῆ δὲ θύραζε
χωλεύων ...
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In the Aeneid Venus too will need extraordinary weapons if her son Aeneas is to 
win the war against the Italians, and naturally she will have to request them from 
Vulcan. The fire-god comes down from the sky into the forges beneath the isle of 
Lipari, flanking the Sicilian coast. There the Cyclopes Bronte, Sterope and Pyrac-
mon toil in an immense cave (Aen. 8.439 ff.).
“Drop everything,” said the god Vulcan, “break off the tasks you have begun. Cyclopes of 
Etna, pay attention to me; weapons must be forged for an unconquerable man. Now we 
need strength, swift hands, now we need every skill in your art; make haste, no slacking!” 
He said no more. And they instantly all busied themselves and divided the task into equal 
parts. The bronze flows in streams and the golden metal and murderous iron melts in the 
enormous furnace. They shape an immense shield, sufficient alone to protect against all the 
missiles of the Latins, and they weld seven circles together with another seven. Some suck 
in and expel the air with the wind of the bellows; others dip the hissing bronze in water; 
the cave groans at the blows on the anvil. Some, with enormous strength, raise their arms 
together in rhythm and turn over the ore with strong pincers.
“Tollite cuncta,” inquit, “coeptosque auferte labores,
Aetnaei Cyclopes, et huc advertite mentem;
arma acri facienda viro. Nunc viribus usus,
nunc manibus rapidis, omni nunc arte magistra.
praecipitate moras.” Nec plura effatus; at illi 
ocius incubuere omnes pariterque laborem
sortiti. Fluit aes riuis aurique metallum
uulnificus chalybs uasta fornace liquescit.
Ingentem clipeum informant, unum omnia contra
tela Latinorum, septenosque orbibus orbes
impediunt. Alii uentosos follibus auras
accipiunt redduntque, alii stridentia tingunt
aera lacu: gemit impositis incudibus antrum
illi inter sese multa ui brachia tollunt
in numerum uersantque tenaci forcipe massam.
Homer’s Hephaestus is a sooty smith who bustles, hairy and sinewy, beating on 
the anvil and sweating in front of the oven-chimney; when he receives an import-
ant visitor he carefully puts away his tools, cleans himself up as best he can and 
puts on a fresh tunic, so as not to seem too ugly. 
Virgil’s Vulcan, on the other hand, is the god and lord of fire; the giant Cyclo-
pes work for him and he orders them to forge Aeneas’ armour; they alone are 
affected by toil and physical effort. In the Aeneid the gods have become superior 
beings who regulate the affairs of the universe; when they want to involve them-
selves in human affairs, they use intermediaries who act on their orders, demons 
or enslaved spirits. The Virgilian sense of decorum has detached them from the 
earthly world.
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It is obvious that making Homer sublime requires the sacrifice of a conspicu-
ous part of his totalizing imaginative vitality. We can use a metaphor and say that 
the multicoloured ancient statue has long since lost its vivid hues; the Roman 
renaissance must be content with the bare gleam of white marble—an impover-
ishment which nonetheless becomes in the Aeneid a choice for sobriety and com-
posure.
This increase in theological dignity is not the only outcome of Virgilian strain-
ing towards the sublime, even if it is its most apparent feature. In the depth of this 
sublime nestles an utterly Roman sense of dignity and grandeur.14 But it func-
tions also by exclusion, inasmuch as it ejects fabulous and surreal excesses from 
the narrative; the sublime would render itself futile without a certain credibility 
in the facts related, without a reasonably sensible representation. That is why the 
Roman sublime, while it raises the level of characters, events and objects, also 
cultivates a calculated preference for the lifelike. Often the Homeric model would 
have appeared to Virgil outmoded to the point of losing decorum, to the point of 
being aprepes.  One had to intervene and impose the standard of decorum.
Look what has become of Thersites, the hunchback limping fool of the Iliad, 
loud-mouthed and mean-spirited, malicious and boorish, the buffoon on whom 
the outraged Odysseus wields his scepter. Virgil found it useful to put on stage in 
the eleventh book (336 ff.) the figure of a dissident who disputed the decision of 
the princes in the assembly and proposed alternative motions, and Thersites was 
transformed into Drances the demagogue, opposed to the proud willfulness of 
Turnus. Although he is moved by jealousy and personal envy, he always defends 
the legitimate interests of the community and uses fairly correct arguments; he 
shows respect for the heroic valour of the enemy, Aeneas. In short, this is a nega-
tive personality, ready of tongue and clever in rousing the passions of the people, 
but he is not morally unworthy. The filter of decorum has stripped him of the 
vulgar (even comical) features of the Homeric model and integrated him into a 
unitary setting of dignified sublimity.
Let me cite one more example of the ways in which Virgilian imitation 
reduces everything in Homer that overdoes the quotidian, and shapes it to his 
own demands of moderation.15 While the battle rages between Greeks and Trojans 
over the corpse of Patroclus, Achilles wants to return to battle, but lacking his 
armour he tries to put his enemies to flight simply by showing himself and raising 
14 On Virgil’s sublime we should still read the pages of R. Heinze Virgils Epische Technik, 
Leipzig-Berlin, Teubner 19153, pp. 481–93.
15 Read Seneca Suasoriae 1.12 Vergilius…ita magnitudine studet, ut non imprudenter discedat a 
fide (he does not distance himself from the right degree of the plausible).
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his well-known battle-cry. This unexpected apparition throws the Trojans into 
confusion (18.215–231):
Then Achilles dear to Zeus arose, and Athena threw over his strong shoulders the fringed 
aegis and she crowned his head with a gilded cloud; from his body there flashed a glittering 
blaze of fire. Just as when smoke rises to heaven rearing itself up far from a city on an island 
beset by the siege of enemies, and the besieged fight the whole day in a dread battle outside 
the city, and when the sun sinks the fires blaze up densely so that the neighbours see them 
and come with ships to save them; so from the head of Achilles a beam of light rose to 
heaven. He stopped on the trench outside the walls, but did not mingle with the Achaeans; 
he respected his mother’s wise counsel. Here standing aloft he shouted, while Pallas Athene 
too shouted out; among the Trojans an immense confusion broke out. 
Let us compare an episode from the tenth book of the Aeneid. Aeneas (who like 
Achilles had withdrawn, offended) now makes his reappearance after a long 
absence. He had been obliged to travel far away from the battlefield to make 
a treaty with Evander and with the Etruscans of lord Tarchon. On the flagship 
he was guiding the fleet of the allies; at the sight of him erect on the poop the 
besieged Trojans exult and the attacking Rutuli are dismayed (260–75). What the 
Trojans and Rutuli see is a metallic flash; the steel gleams from Aeneas’ helmet 
and his shield sends back waves of golden light (270–75).
The crest burns on his head and an ominous flame shot from his helmet, the golden shield 
sent out vast rays, just as at times on a clear night bloody comets glow a gloomy red, or the 
burning star of Sirius rises bringing thirst and disease to wretched mortals, and afflicts the 
sky with its light.
Ardet apex capitit tristisque a uertice flamma
funditur et uastos umbo uomit aureus ignis;
non secus ac liquida si quando nocte cometae
sanguinei lugubre rubent, aut Sirius ardor
ille sitim morbosque ferens mortalibus aegris
nascitur et laeuo contristat lumine caelum.
There is nothing supernatural in the dismay that the apparition of Aeneas spreads 
among the Rutuli; there is no terrifying effect of Athena’s aegis, no cloud of gold 
that casts frightful rays of light; the miraculous equipment that covered with 
dreadful flames Achilles’ entire body has vanished. Virgil has made the whole 
scene realistic. He has rationalized it by eliminating every form of prodigy, every 
trace of the fabulous. The rays that accompany the arrival of Aeneas are naturally 
caused by the new armour forged by Vulcan, their gleam is the genuine shine of 
metal that reflects light. The Trojan hero terrorizes the Rutuli only because they 
see him returning, resolved to do battle. This is the result of a process of “secu-
 Stealing the club from Hercules   31
larization” that makes the glory and courage of Aeneas human, giving an earthly 
foundation to his valour. There is nothing in this scene foreign to his heroic char-
acter—a heroic character that was born in the world of myth but is making its way 
towards history.
Virgil’s imitation of Homer, as you will have understood long since, oscillates 
between repetition and transformation. Most of the time the two procedures act 
simultaneously and belong to the same act of composition, and it would be diffi-
cult to separate them. It is the repetition that makes itself apparent most immedi-
ately. For example, the war in Latium between Trojans and Italians is often pre-
sented as a repetition of the war at Troy.16 But it is not a passive mirroring; at the 
beginning the Trojans find themselves besieged and near defeat, yet in the end 
they will be the victors, and Aeneas will kill Turnus, as Achilles killed Hector in 
the Iliad. In the new Iliad the Trojans are destined to win, as reparation for the 
destruction that their country has suffered; in the ethics of Virgil only the man 
who has suffered defeat acquires the right to the burdensome responsibility of 
victory. It is clear that the repetition is also an outdoing of Homer: the war, despite 
the struggle and suffering it entails, will take them not to destruction, but to the 
construction of a new unity.17
The second imitative procedure, that of transformation, is certainly less 
immediately perceptible than the other, even if it is more widespread. The reader 
who has the patience to analyse in depth on each occasion the elements that arise 
in the Aeneid from the rewriting of Homer also has access to the secrets of Virgil’s 
modus operandi. The transformation of the model moves in step with the pathetic 
intensification that the poet always imprints on his narrative, or more precisely 
with the “empathetic” elaboration that the narrative undergoes. Virgil does not 
remain aloof from events, but explores the state of mind of the persons in the 
action, giving voice to his own and their subjectivity; he looks at things from their 
point of view. He bestows luster on the events reported, either from outside by 
introducing unexpected peripeteiae and actions, or internally, by relating the 
sentiments and hardships of every character involved.
Still advancing the argument by means of comparisons, we now set the scene 
with Palinurus in the sixth book of the Aeneid (6.340–83) alongside the corre-
16 Cf e.g. Aen. 6.88–94 Non Simois tibi nec Xanthus nec Dorica castra/ defuerint; alius Latio iam 
partus Achilles / natus et ipse dea; nec Teucris addita Iuno usquam aberit…/../ Causa mali tanti co­
niunx iterum hospita Teucris / externique iterum thalami. See too 8.538 ff. quam multa sub undas/ 
scuta uirum galeasque et fortia corpora uolues, / Thybri pater! and compare 1.100 ff. ubi tot Simois 
correpta sub undis/ scuta uirum galeasque et fortia corpora uoluit.
17 For an acute and innovative examination of the “repetition” of Homer in the Aeneid, cf. D. 
Quint Repetition and Ideology in the Aeneid, “Materiali e Discussioni per l’analisi dei testi classici”, 
33, 1989, pp. 9–54 (now in his Epic and Empire, Princeton University Press, 1993, pp. 50–96.
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sponding scene with Elpenor in the Odyssey (11.51–80).18  In Homer we have the 
grief of Odysseus and the bare words of Elpenor, who briefly recalls his misfor-
tune and asks that his body be given a proper burial. In Virgil first and foremost 
there is the exposure of the ambiguous oracle (the “substitute sacrifice” of 5.815; 
unum pro multis dabitur caput “one life will be given in exchange for many”), then 
the grieving speech of Palinurus, who shows all the ethos of the faithful servant, 
followed by a pathetic narrative and the description of his actual suffering, and 
finally his prayer to be carried beyond the Styx. His prayer is rejected by the Sibyl 
(“do not expect to sway divine decrees with prayers”), but this is compensated by 
the reassuring promise that he will receive burial and his name will be preserved 
in the memory of all; a bitter consolation, conceded to another of the many inno-
cent victims of Fate.
Chomsky’s transformationalism—much superior to structuralism, which 
while effective in its functionalist description of language, usually showed itself 
minimally interested in problems of linguistic creativity—has put the accent on 
so-called competence, that capacity that allows the man who starts from a form 
of discourse to generate other forms equivalent to or resembling it. In this per-
spective the act of imitation is the outcome of a generative competence which 
starts from the models but then disassembles and reassembles them, welds them 
together and doubles them, manipulates them, and recombines them. In short, 
if we take this path it is clear that Homer for the Aeneid is not so much the object 
of imitation as the matrix of imitation, the productive generator of new realiza-
tions. Here is the reason why Virgil seeks a direct and agonistic relationship with 
Homer, a vis­à­vis that can never compare with his incidental retrieval of other 
models offered by Greek and Latin literature. However evident the traces left by 
the great Attic tragedies, by Apollonius Rhodius, by Ennius, Lucretius, Catullus 
and many other poets, imitation in these cases consists always of brilliant remi-
niscences, of evocative transplants, of leaping grafts; in these we are dealing with 
occasional furta, not all of them conscious. Homer alone is the subject of a consti-
tutively different imitation, reserved only for him: his poems are plundered under 
the drive of a poetic intent that realizes itself in acts of appropriation. As we have 
heard Macrobius say, that the guiding idea was for the Aeneid to be constructed 
de Homeri speculo; this such mirroring would have achieved the systematic incor-
poration of its model, but would have thrown into relief at the same time its con-
tinuing divergences from the model. With his poetic project Virgil seemed to want 
to appropriate above all a form, but behind the surface the reader was required to 
discover the insinuation, disruptive even if covert, of new contents, that is to say 
the proposal of other values and a different “form of the world.” 
18 See Heinze Virgil’s Epische Technik (cited above), p. 465.
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If we are to believe Flaubert and Aby Warburg, God is hidden in the details. 
I would like to summon a detail here in order to demonstrate to what extent, 
and with what minute persistence, Virgil has devoted himself to the imitation of 
Homer. In Aen 3.464, the seer Helenus loads the ships of Aeneas with gold, silver 
and other precious wares—“weighty gifts of old and wrought ivory” dona dehinc 
auro gravia ac secto elephanto. The clausula secto elephanto is stamped with the 
mark of Homer.19 It is the calc of one of his formulaic clausulae (repeated twice 
in the Odyssey at 18.196 and 19.564): πριστοῦ ἐλέφαντος. Besides appropriating 
the words of his model, Virgil has stolen from Homer the very rare hiatus which 
separates the adjective from the noun here, a metrical tour de force which by itself 
denounces the thief and makes him a self-confessed offender. Certainly Virgil’s 
act is an exhibition of bravura, but (I hope I am not letting myself be caught in 
an impressionistic suggestion) I believe that the imitator this time did not want 
to mask or disguise his theft; instead he preferred to reproduce the model in its 
intangibility, contemplating it unchanged. A gesture of admiration and homage, 
it seems to me, more than the nonchalant gesture of a thief. Perhaps it is the 
gesture of a thief conveying his gratitude.
19 In fact the unanimous manuscript tradition and not a few editors read dona dehinc auro 
grauia sectoque elephanto. Servius, who also reads this text, notes the prolongation in arsi of the 
last syllable of gravia, to justify it finalitatis ratione: he is troubled (sed satis aspere) but accepts 
the text. Many editors in his wake cite as reinforcement Georg. 1.279; Aen. 3.91 and 12.363 (in 
all three passages the phenomenon of prolongation in arsi involves the enclitic –que). But the 
corruption had a more complex genesis. Schaper understood this when he recognized that secto 
elephanto was a calc of a Homeric clausula particularly notorious for its hiatus. The imitation of 
this unusual hiatus in Latin must have created confusion very early among its ancient readers, 
given that the verse was readjusted as it has been transmitted; scribes wrote sectoque and the 
scandal was eliminated, but this also cancelled out the borrowing from Homer. Schaper had 
no difficulty, once he had detected the trail of imitation, in restoring the verse to its original 
form, dona dehinc auro grauia ac secto elephanto. Cf. G.B.Conte Ope Ingenii; esperienze di critica 
testuale, Pisa, Edizione della Normale 2013, pp. 100–101 (= Ope ìngenii, Experiences of Textual 
Criticism, Berlin/Boston, DeGruyter, 2013, pp. 88–89).
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I would like to attempt […] to show how these displacements 
are displacements within a system, and thus entail a multitude 
of connections with the other elements of the system
and with the entire linguistic culture of the corrector.
Gianfranco Contini 1 
I could have given a fine title to this little book by naming it Forty Years After. 
In that case I would have parodied Alexandre Dumas’s Twenty Years After, and 
even doubled it. In this sequel to The Three Musketeers, as we all know, the nar-
rative is often veined with nostalgia; and even my new little book inevitably con-
tains some wisps of nostalgia for Memoria dei poeti e sistema letterario, which 
I wrote just forty years ago. But I guarantee to the reader that I will keep under 
control every tendency to melancholy, exorcizing it on purpose with some polem-
ical sallies. In fact that book of mine had embarrassingly good fortune, enough 
to generate a fallout of unwelcome followers who, while claiming to make good 
use of my arguments, often abused them, making me responsible for, if not com-
plicitous in some of their intolerable interpretative deviations. “Blame Voltaire,” 
said protesters against the revolution—but truly Voltaire did not have anything 
to do with it. Perhaps this is the right opportunity to reconstruct the cultural and 
methodological horizon which was dominant forty years ago and conditioned for 
better or for worse the elaboration of these old ideas.
Memoria dei poeti e sistema letterario was published by Einaudi in 1974,2 
during the final years of structuralism. Indeed, structuralism had begun to cel-
ebrate its triumphs some decades since; the first samples of literary semiology 
had even taken form, and some philosophers and critics were already working 
on a “post-structuralism,” which in fact did not aim to disprove the foundational 
principles of the doctrine, but even while starting from them – and contaminat-
ing them with Nietzschean impulses – was driving them to extreme theoretical 
consequences, to the point of disintegrating them in the direction of relativism. 
The Nietzschean grafts were actually poisoned – or better, wrenched arbitrarily 
from the system of thought to which they belonged rather than put into action 
with conscious awareness. Too bad for poor Nietzsche, accustomed to violations 
by fanatical interpreters; but the most serious damage afflicted literary criticism, 
which these gentlemen actually wanted to advance.
1 In Implicazioni leopardiane, “Letteratura 9/33, 1847, p. 102, now in Varianti e altra linguistica. 
Una raccolta di saggi (1938–68), Turin, Einaudi 1970, p. 41.
2 Initially included in the series “La Ricerca letteraria,” it was reprinted in 1985 in the “PBE” 
series.
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But we will talk about all of this a little further on, when the text turns to 
polemic. For now let us reflect calmly on the happy encounter between structural-
ism (especially in the critical forms of literary semiology) and the nineteenth-cen-
tury tradition of the study of historical philology (Geistesgeschichte), in which a 
late-idealistic framework was dominant, sporadically contaminated by residues 
of positivism and some incursions of Marxist historicism. A fine confrontation, 
that, in which the structuralist lesson certainly served to infuse literary research 
with a stronger methodological rigor. I am profoundly convinced of this, and 
would like to give my reasons (not without adding my honest reservations).
Now that structuralism’s prime has long since passed, no one will want to 
bury it without ceremony; it has left the stage, but the teachings it left in its stead 
are in good health – and in many cases they have become useful acquisitions. 
It was not a philosophy, as some persons have believed. If we really want to, we 
could say that it was a minor philosophy, perhaps nothing more than a direc-
tion of thought. To its misfortune it won such universal support that it became 
almost a fashion, and this harmed it so much that fashionability brought on its 
obsolescence. Many disciplines made use of it; some were predisposed to take 
advantage of it, while others abused it to the point of violation. But if its status as 
doctrine was fairly weak, the procedures of its method were rigorous and effec-
tive. Above all structuralism had a talent for analysis. Indeed it knew how to put 
in evidence the elements of which every cultural artifact consists. It knew how to 
make explicit the functional relations which bind the single elements together 
in every complex formation. Its anti-historicist, anti-humanist and anti-existen-
tialist appearance intimidated critics, and for this reason many honourable men 
opposed it. They actually came to fear that structuralism would have imprisoned 
History itself in aprioristic systems by denying it all autonomous liberty; they 
accused it of wanting to constrict into pale abstractions the vital variety of his-
torical process, by its nature manifold and changeable, and congenitally beyond 
reduction.
This mistaken accusation was advanced by all those who at that time wanted 
to defend a late-idealistic conception of the human sciences (a conception which, 
one may well say, concealed, besides neo-romantic and anti-enlightenment 
preju dices, a theological vision of History). Against Historicism, which had a 
substantially “longitudinal” idea of reality—that is, it interpreted things in terms 
of development and evolution—the structuralists asserted a conception that we 
might call “transversal”; they interpreted reality itself as a relatively constant, or 
at least uniform, system of relationships. Following this trajectory, it was inevita-
ble that they would also come to deny (or at least diminish) the autonomy of the 
subject: it is not we who think, but the thoughts that make us think; it is not we 
who speak, but the words that speak in us. If the various forms of humanism were 
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all inevitably exposed to being reproached as forms of subjectivism, one could 
always rely on the objectivity of the structure. 
However, if we observe it from the present point of view, structure, even when 
it implies the idea of a system, is not at all an obvious system, one immediately 
visible. Rather, it is provided by the order which the various components take on 
inside the system. And in that internal order we should also include the trans-
formations which the system undergoes. Here is a nodal point: history makes 
itself knowable through just these transformations, it is in them alone that the 
manifold effects of becoming make themselves visible. In short, despite the accu-
sations of historicists, the structuralist project failed to preach a sort of Parmeni-
dean immobility. The structuralists, being above all attentive to the correspon-
dences set up thanks to synchronic analysis, obviously acknowledged diachronic 
movement, but for them temporal changes occurred only as transformations 
inside the system; they were nothing but oscillations within the limits imposed 
by the system itself. Precisely because the structure is a system of transforma-
tions, it controls itself by internal rules and preserves itself – and even enriches 
itself – thanks to the play of its transformations. Saussure illustrated the opposi-
tion between synchrony and diachrony by using the example of chess: during a 
game the arrangement of the pieces modifies itself with every move, but can be 
completely described by starting from the position in which every piece is found. 
To advance the game, it is unimportant to know at a given moment what moves 
have already been played, and in what order. The particular condition of the 
game represented by the arrangement of the pieces can be described synchronic-
ally, that is, without reference to the previous moves. Nevertheless there is a large 
dose of simplification in the radical nature of this abstract opposition: it is still 
true that the static conception of synchrony is a weakness of the first (orthodox) 
structuralism. In reality there cannot be a synchronic study without diachronic 
analysis; constant changes intervene in the system of an epoch. It even happens 
that we conceive synchrony in a dynamic fashion, since it is occupied by the germ 
of transformation.
I could have done without this very elementary sketch of structuralist thought, 
since it contains matters well known to all, but a malicious interest drove me on; 
I wanted my prefatory words in this chapter to have a partisan inclination. To 
prepare the reader I needed to stress these specific aspects of the structuralist 
legacy over others. I should only add, as a partial disavowal of the theoretical 
picture outlined above, that the very notion of structure has not always been given 
a stable definition, and in fact every single discipline which has taken inspiration 
from structuralism has emphasized only particular aspects of the theory, leaving 
in the shade those that were less productive for their own specific purposes. Their 
methods turned out in practice to be diversified because they were applied to 
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different fields of research. For this reason it is difficult to give a uniform and 
comprehensive definition of what the structuralist method ought to be.3 Rather 
it is proper to refer to a family of methods; sharing a common stock at base, and 
often sharing some polemical purposes as well, these practical procedures varied 
according to circumstances. Every discipline – linguistics, anthropology, literary 
criticism and philology – had its own habits and interests which were obviously 
conditioned by the specific demands of its content. Consequently every method 
ends by finding the tools best suited to the job, rehabilitating and adjusting from 
time to time its own traditional critical workshop.
Linguistics was the vanguard, and linguists above all were the theorists of 
novelty, starting with the patriarch Saussure. More than two thousand years of 
refined meditation on questions of language had prepared the soil, making it 
particularly receptive to methodological innovations. So it fell to linguistics to 
elaborate a toolbox of efficient analytical instruments, and only linguistics suc-
ceeded in hewing out a scientific, we might say, profile. Structuralism could not 
(nor would it have been able to) give the status of science to every one of the 
disciplines which traced themselves back to it; it could only inspire slightly bet-
ter-organized analyses that would go beyond the accidental nature of single ad 
hoc observations. If analysis is the critical method that teaches us to disassemble 
an organic whole into its constituent parts, and then describe the parts and show 
their relations with the whole, then analysis certainly should have been the first 
stage of each structuralist exploration. The theoretical foundation presupposed 
was that language was a system, and the value of every element in this system 
was determined by the total sum of differences which distinguished it from all the 
other elements. Inseparable from the notion of system was the idea that the con-
stitutive elements were interdependent and had developed in each case specific 
functions subordinated precisely to the system.
This was the fundamental theoretical equipment (system, structure, function), 
but occasionally a set of subordinate concepts intruded, often studded with tech-
nical terms like “opposition,” “contrastivity,” “synchrony,” “diachrony,” “denota-
tion,” “connotation,” “code,” “paradigm,” “transformation.” Linguistics gladly lent 
its critical lexicon to other disciplines, some affine, some remote, but in any case all 
eager to work with instruments that would appear less vague and more exact, rigor-
ously defined and thus more reliable in their application. In particular the consan-
guinity that bound structural linguistics and semiology to formalistic criticism was 
soon evident; so it came to pass that research into the form of expression in literary 
texts was a field of work common to linguists and philologists—common but not 
3 See P. Pettit, The concept of structuralism: a critical analysis, Berkeley-Los Angeles, U. Califor-
nia Press 1975.
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undifferentiated. For linguists, language is an autonomous object of research; they 
observe it, seek out its rules, describe its functioning, and are interested above all 
in its potentiality of meaning. On the other hand, for philologists – as interpreters 
and critics – language exists only when it is already realized in texts and does not 
demand to be considered outside those concrete textual achievements. Their own 
activity is bound up in these texts: hoc opus, hic labor est.
In short, the practical demands of philology, rather than the sallies extra 
moenia of linguists, soon precipitated a divorce and each discipline freely took up 
its own path. Contact and methodological overlap had, however, enriched with 
new stimuli the critical study of literary texts, thus opening up advantageous per-
spectives. It is not unhelpful to recall that while there were many changes which 
interested the sciences of humanity as a whole, perhaps the most important 
outcome was the appearance of theories that explicitly touched on materials and 
themes previously considered only from a historical point of view. It was then that, 
after ending the dictatorship of various historicisms, every discipline (linguistics, 
literature, philology) came to divide itself into two distinct approaches, one the-
oretical and one historical. These approaches seemed at the time to be opposed, 
but then successfully made themselves complementary. I even believe that, while 
reducing its absolute hegemony, History has to some extent safeguarded its role 
(at least in the panorama of Italian literary studies); it renounced the pretence of 
being the passe-partout capable of opening every lock of the cultural edifice and 
has accepted with reasonable good humor being simply one critical component 
alongside the others.
* * * 
I would like the brief statement of Gianfranco Contini which serves as epigraph to 
this second chapter to be an homage to my great teacher, but I also want to bring 
explicitly into the light one of the cardinal ideas that provoked forty years ago my 
studies on “arte allusiva” and on the memory of classical poets. In Contini’s brisk 
phrasing the concept of “system” stands out clear and categorical: in the criticism 
of variants, every correction introduced by the author into his own text enters into 
a whole body of contextual relations; the equilibrium of the system adjusts itself to 
accommodate the change and produces each time a new structural arrangement. 
Benedetto Croce in a polemical spirit baptized this type of literary research the 
“criticism of discards” (“critica degli scartafacci”).4 Contini reclaimed the pejora-
4 Illusione sulla genesi delle opere d’arte documentata dagli scartafacci degli scrittori, in “Qua-
derni della Critica” 9, 1947, pp. 93–4 (=Nuove pagine sparse, Bari, Laterza 1966, pp. 238–9).
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tive formula and even proudly used it as a title for his own method.5 The fact is that 
Croce’s criticism, born from a principle of absolute formalism, could not stoop to 
compromise with form understood in material terms; he made no concessions to 
the concreteness and physicality of expression but answered to a rigorously formal 
aesthetic in which form was made to preserve a purely ideal character. Croce’s crit-
icism was for this reason obliged to develop uniquely by dwelling on the sense of 
content, the sense of its harmony and congruence—that sense which in every poet 
was identified as the guiding motive, dominating the work. Hence the almost com-
plete lack in Croce of any nuance of a technical kind, of any linguistic analysis, of 
any respect (not to mention any hint of admiration or enjoyment) for particular 
effects of style – in short, a complete lack of interest in the philology of the literary 
text, and open disparagement of the activity of philology as well. 
Given that the act of intuition is for Croce purely ideal, and the work of art is 
already perfect in itself, idealistic doctrine sees itself as entirely alien to empiricism. 
Written poetry, the painted picture, music translated into notes, are all projections 
of the ideal work onto a medium, and do not belong to its creation but to its commu-
nication. Contini, on the contrary (it is difficult for him to be post-Crocian without 
becoming anti-Crocian) believes above all in empiricism, and does not admit that 
the act of intuition is purely ideal, nor that the work of poetry is already perfectly 
brought to completion in the very moment in which its idea is confronted.6 He 
maintains that written poetry is not just communication but creation itself, or at 
least that it is creation comparable to that of the Platonic demiurge: it is the work 
of an artisan, someone who shapes the material and works on its form. Criticism of 
the author’s variants is based on this artisanal (or craftsmanlike) aspect of poetic 
activity. Critics who like Croce are anchored to the idea of poetry as a business of 
“contemplation” will also be able to continue believing in a distinction between 
poetry and non-poetry and imagining that a poetic work is, like Athena inside 
Zeus’s head, ready to leap out fully armed, a divine prodigy that is born already 
achieved. If aesthetic criticism considers the poetic text a value, for the philologist 
of “discards” it is instead a perpetual approximation towards value.
Contini is interested in form, but not in its resolution into formalism or self-sat-
isfied aestheticism. He sees poetry as an elaboration of the verbal material, as a 
stratification or modification of textual elements, as a process of formation. For 
5 La Critica degli Scartafacci, in “Rassegna d’ Italia”, 3, 1948, pp. 1048–56 and 1156–60 (now in 
id. La critica degli scartafacci e altre pagine sparse, with a memoir by A. Roncaglia, Pisa, Scuola 
Normale Superiore 1992, pp. 1–32).
6 See M. Ciliberto, Contini, e gli ‘scartafacci’, in “Giornale critico della filosofia Italiana” seventh 
series, 7, 2013, pp. 277–301 (now reprinted as the introductory essay to G. Contini “L’influenza 
culturale di Benedetto Croce,” Pisa, Edizioni della Normale 2013).
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him the poet is an operarius (workman) endowed with talent – and by “talent” 
I am designating that special capacity which the Romantics would call “genius” 
and which in reality is an aptitude that combines intelligence and imagination, 
but also meditation and calculation. This conception of poetry as industriousness 
activates a sort of correspondence – I would say collaboration – between the poet 
and the critic, who are fraternally united by a common experience of industry; the 
critic (he too is an operarius who employs logical instruments) becomes a sort of 
deputy in the poet’s workshop.
Criticism based on variants was subsequently destined to have important res-
onances in editorial practice, even becoming a relevant part of the equipment of 
modern philologists and editors. But, as I said before, with respect to my work 
of forty years ago, nothing was more instructive than Contini’s conception of the 
text as “system.” In this respect Contini was a precursor of the early attempts at 
structuralism, a forerunner of critical experiments that were already incubating; 
the dynamic of his “criticism of discards” seems, in fact, to have been profoundly 
modified by the idea that author’s variants had a structural function in relation 
to all the elements of the text. This seemed to me an exemplary idea that could be 
fruitfully transferred to research (which I was just beginning) on poetic memory, 
on allusions between texts, and on literary imitation in general; I quickly realized 
that in keeping with this same principle, every poet, in order to appropriate his 
so-called “sources,” had to transform them into functional elements within the 
structure of his own text, the text that was just then welcoming them.
Typically the old hunt for sources (Quellenforschung, in which classical 
German philology has exercised absolute domination, under the influence of 
positivistic science emerging from the heart of nineteenth-century historicism) 
had rediscovered in literary texts, but in a casual and disorganized way, countless 
reminiscences of detail. This exercise was virtually an end in itself: instead of 
inquiring whether or to what extent the sources identified had integrated them-
selves into the structure of individual works, the source-hunters had prepared 
accurate enumerations of imitation and borrowings – all useful for gaining an 
understanding of the cultural formation of an author and his literary and lin-
guistic conditioning,7 but insufficient in themselves if one wanted to apprehend 
the effective poetic structure of the works under examination. Contini, rather, 
based his critical method on premises of a decidedly unitary – I would even call 
it organic – stamp: the text, defined precisely as a system, is for him a device, a 
7 This assessment of Quellenforschung underlies much of the work of Wilhelm Kroll, a rigid pos-
itivist and most learned thrasher of poetic imitatio in the name of an absolute originality, but 
his Studien zum Verständnis der Römischen Literatur are still valuable (Stuttgart, Metzler 1924 
[19642], in particular the seventh chapter on Originalität und Nachahmung, pp. 139–84).
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complex mechanism, and for this reason is subordinated to all the laws govern-
ing a mechanism, such as its functional efficiency, its tendency to equilibrium, 
and the principle of the interaction of parts.
To me this criterion seemed decisive. From this starting point, however, I 
was able to take one further step forward. It was not only the individual poetic 
text that constituted a system: in the eyes of each new poet, the entire body of 
the Graeco-Roman literary tradition itself constituted a system. It was actually 
an articulated repertory of texts committed to common memory; forms, phrases, 
and discourses, precipitated in different times and cultures, still offered them-
selves synchronically at the moment of a new creation. Thus it comes to pass that 
in the folds of every text are concealed a plurality of other texts, indeed countless 
models; rather than hidden, the tradition is masked behind new language which 
covers it with its own weighty presence. This tradition, if one wants to think of it 
as a map, is like a road-map with labels indicating regions and places, more or less 
distant, set here and there in space (and time); it is a myriad of preceding develop-
ments, of gradual transformations, of innumerable precursors which reduplicate 
themselves on each occasion. But tradition is also the necessary vehicle for the 
new element, the pharmacological substance (as it were) with which the invented 
medication is compounded in order to administer it more efficiently.
From another aspect, it is tradition that is presupposed in literary legibility; 
in fact the sense and structure of a work cannot be apprehended without relating 
them to certain models, themselves excavated from a long series of texts of which 
they are in some sense the recurring constants. Outside this system the poetic work 
would not be intelligible; its correct reception requires the reader to possess a good 
competence in deciphering the literary language, a capacity derived from practical 
knowledge of a multiplicity of texts. This is how the reader of a poetic work – who 
advances along the surface of the text – finds himself caught up in a dialectical 
movement that forces him to dive beneath this verbal appearance and exposes him 
to a dialogue with other submerged voices. This dialogue spurs him to gather traces 
or superimpositions, to measure the originality of the text which he is reading, and 
to include it in a typology and so recognize it as a new species of a known genus. 
In short, an interlocutory model of the relationships between texts is far superior 
to the customary conception of “influence,” which is too superficial and decisively 
insufficient to define the systematic relations that bind different texts from the 
same tradition.8 One must keep in mind that the classical practice of imitation is 
also an invitation to a double reading of texts, an invitation to decipher their rela-
8 For a more extended treatment see G.B. Conte, A. Barchiesi, Imitazione e arte allusiva. Modi 
e funzioni dell’intertestualità, in Lo spazio letterario di Roma antica, I, La produzione del testo, 
Roma, Salerno editrice 1989, pp. 81–114.
 A critical retrospective: method and its limits   43
tionship with their models; the styles of reading in every epoch are also implicit in 
their styles of writing. In this sense literary works are never simple memories, but 
rewrite their reminiscences; we might say paradoxically – if we must preserve this 
term – that they “influence” their predecessors, inasmuch as they modify them and 
redetermine their relevance within the body of the tradition.
It is obvious how widely such a perspective differs from the much blamed (but 
too severely, let us admit) “source criticism.” The latter was the point of departure 
of Giorgio Pasquali’ essay on Arte Allusiva. But he aimed to distinguish himself 
from it. The bitter polemics which between the last years of the nineteenth century 
and the first decade of the twentieth had set the positivists of the “historicist 
school” in Italian literary criticism (above all romance philologists from Carducci 
to d’Ancona, from Raina to Mussafia, from A. Bartoli to E. Novati) in opposition 
to the priests of pure ecstatic poetry, like E. Thovez and G.A. Cesareo, still cast a 
long shadow. The accusation brought by the latter scholars against their adver-
saries was that of arid and suffocating “philologism.” The crime (unpardonable 
in their eyes) was “treason against poetry.”9 Even Croce had entered into the dis-
pute,10 and if he had little sympathy with positivist research into sources, he had 
even less for the hunt for “plagiarisms” conducted by Thovez and his disciples; 
in questions of literature he did not seem at all inclined to accept allegations of 
plagiarism presented in a moral context (from the beginning the stumbling block 
had been the poetic work of Gabriele d’Annunzio, marked by constant plunder-
ing and often bejewelled with lexical thefts). Taking a different point of view, the 
philosopher of idealistic historicism declared it was important “to have an exact 
awareness of the way in which art and science really had evolved, and of sources 
and tributaries that are an integral part of their genesis.”11 In short, is it good to 
know those sources; they are elements of history.
Croce’s disagreements were nonetheless resolutions of the questions; and so 
also with the romance philologists who confronted each other afterwards (E.G. 
Parodi, F. Torraca, C. De Lollis, M. Barbi), “source criticism,” made more articu-
late and lively, found a new footing. But the discrediting mortgage that weighed 
on the studies (long since mocked as “crenological” or “fontanological,” without 
9 The survey of G.F. Pasini, Dossier sulla critica dei fonti (1896–1909), Bologna, Patron 1988, is 
very useful.
10 La Critica Letteraria. Questioni teoriche, Rome, Loescher 1894 (18961), then in Primi Saggi, 
Bari Laterza, 1919 (19272), where we read on p. 92: “it is helpful here to note that if source criti-
cism has been highly exalted in Italy in recent times, men have neglected to enumerate the many 
dangers to which the excessive and distorted use of source criticism can give rise. The chief risk 
is the illusion that a literary work breaks down into the sources to which it has been traced back.”
11 B. Croce, Il plagio e la Letteratura, in “La Critica” 1, 1903, pp. 468–70 (=Problemi di estetica e 
contributi alla storia dell’estetica italiana), Bari, Laterza 1910 (19666), pp. 67–70.
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acrimony but in a condescending tone) had not been entirely repaid. Pasquali 
knew this, or at least felt it, as if it were a congenital vice of philology, or at least 
a weakness that had to be excused. In fact, he began his celebrated essay of 
1942, Arte allusiva, in muted tones: he was conscious that the accumulation of 
references to the sources of a poet could turn out to be a diminution, either for 
the interpreter or the poet himself. His few pages represented a decisive about-
face in philological studies and opened up new critical horizons. To the notion 
of sources, a determinist and rather mechanical notion, he added intentionality 
via the notion of “allusion,” whereby the poet allowed the model supplied by 
another author to show through a fraction of his own text and appealed to the 
reader’s memory to identify it. A collaboration à deux, created out of open com-
plicity. From the poet’s and reader’s “learned” inheritance the same poetic idea 
leapt out; one evoked it, the other was summoned to recognize it. 
I was aiming to continue on this path. I studied literary allusion and its mech-
anisms, but ended by forcing myself in another direction; I intended to examine 
first and foremost the structural function that literary memory (whether active or 
unconscious) regularly exercises in the creation of texts. Source criticism and even 
Pasqualian allusion attributed the creation of the text to a relationship between 
two subjectivities, concentrating on the personalities of the authors compared and 
not on the objective construction of the texts. I put the accent on the text as struc-
ture, rather than on the author, because I wanted to minimize a frequent risk in the 
criticism of imitations: some people believe they ought always to recognize behind 
each textual similarity the intentionality of a literary subject, the effort of an author 
completely focused on indicating his own capacity for emulation. I also tried to 
show that the art of allusion does not work differently from rhetorical figures, from 
tropes, and that its function in poetic language is no different from that performed 
by a figure. We might say (indeed I must have said this somewhere) that denotation, 
or the “proper” significance of the alluding text, loads itself through connotation 
with an “improper” significance, which is that of the text allusively recalled: this is 
an increment of meaning like the one produced by a metaphor.12 
As far as I am concerned, I aimed, by insisting on the concept of a literary 
system and invoking the analogy of the rhetorical figure, to purify the concept 
12 For clarity I must cite myself, with apologies: “even in the art of allusion, as in every other 
figure, the poetic dimension is produced by the co-presence of two differing realities that aim to 
indicate a single reality as complex as one wishes, but in any case unitary – perhaps undefinable 
by direct means but certainly individuated and specific, at least for the poet. The poetic idea 
stands in the space between the letter and its meaning –without wishing to be only the one or 
the other – and this space (still unknown), this gap, cannot be indicated except by referring to 
the two (known) extremes which limit it” (Memoria dei poeti e sistema letterario, 1974, p. 14).
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of imitation from every excess of intentionalism. Rather than privileging the 
moment of the poet’s subjective engagement, I was giving value to the imper-
sonal and generic moment of literary tradition. After all, insisting on the creative 
subject and its autonomy would appear to be at odds with the mentality and prac-
tice of the ancients. The great merit granted to codifications, genres, institutional 
languages, artistic conventions and so on, ends in reality by drawing closer to 
the real conditions in which classical literature was produced. It seems to me 
that there was in all this a critical profit. All imitations, even those that might 
seem not to be casual, were described as ways in which the literary text functions. 
Obviously one had to recognize a gradation between the various possible forms 
of imitation, from the strong intentionality of the art of allusion to the casual 
recurrence of the most indistinct memory. Nonetheless this was a homogeneous 
picture, and the problem of practicing imitation found a unitary solution here. 
It was the tradition, not the poets, that gave voice to literature; that is, literature 
was controlled by the dominant system of tradition. 
Now I must commit an auto­da­fé that does not aim to be a recantation but the 
simple acknowledgment of a single mistake of mine. Following the guidelines of 
structuralism, which had taught me to give value to the objectivity of literary proce-
dures, and out of love for theoretical coherence, I neglected the undeniable burden 
of intentional subjectivity that the art of allusion, in contrast to other forms of imi-
tation, brought with it. I did not deny it, but neither did I stress it, as I should surely 
have done; this was my sin of omission. The disappearance of the author and of 
his predominance in literature, was the toll that structuralism paid to the aversion 
for idealism that was in command at the time, and I paid the same generational 
tribute. Powerful in the moment of analysis (and therefore fruitful for the work of 
philologists), structuralism was a weak instrument for the comprehensive eval-
uation of the literary artifact. Structuralism, capable of dismantling the text into 
its components, and of describing its functioning and perceiving its interactions, 
still risked enclosing its sense in neutral schemes, ordered but perhaps apathetic. 
It fetishized the text, but it left the reader and his emotions outside. Or better, the 
reader became a function of the text, he became part of the fetish. Formalism had 
already been mistrustful of the empirical reader, and New Criticism had already 
denounced “the affective fallacy,” which was due to “the intentional fallacy.” This 
was the verdict of the two spiritual fathers Wimsatt and Beardsley: “Affective illu-
sion is a confusion between the poem and its consequences, between what it is, and 
what it does.”13 (But it would be fair to ask oneself the question, “Aren’t texts written 
to be read, to provide enjoyment and emotional effects?”)
13 W.K. Wimsatt, M. Beardsley, The Affective Fallacy (1948), in M. Beardsley, The Verbal Icon. 
Studies in the Meaning of Poetry, Lexington, University of Kentucky Press 1954, p. 21.
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Let us return to the intentionality of the art of allusion; there is no doubt that 
it is an inalienable prerogative of the Author (and even of the programmed reader 
obliged to decipher it). But a decisive factor had intervened: the very importance 
that structuralist theory attributed to the special quality of the literary text – to lit-
erariness – had brushed away all the author’s intentions; the author had become 
the black beast of the “new course,” the unwelcome symbol of humanism, of 
subjectivism and of various psychologies that structuralism wanted to exclude 
from literary studies. The anti-intentionalism of structuralists could be so radical 
because it was confident in the self-sufficiency of language, without any reser-
vations; they maintained that the meaning of a text was determined not by the 
author’s intentions but by the system of language, that system on which the lit-
erariness of the text and of the poetic tradition was founded. Obviously, calling 
into dispute the intentions of the Author called into dispute all the counter-con-
ceptions of theory. 
I have already said that structuralism gave me something, but took from me 
something else. It gave me rigor in the study of imitation, it helped me to subor-
dinate the various cases of intertextuality to a unitary and organic process, it sug-
gested to me that the text (we might say, the whole culture) is nothing but a tissue 
woven from continuous citations, deductions, evocations – some visible, other 
imperceptible, all inevitably rooted in tradition. But note also what it took from 
me. If the literary work has two poles – the artistic and the aesthetic – the artistic 
pole is nothing other than the author’s written text; and in interpreting it, as I 
have said before, structuralism was a quite effective instrument. But the aesthetic 
pole, the realization entrusted to the cooperative intelligence of the reader, was 
debased. And this was a step backward in comparison with what the positivist 
and the idealist philology had always known. Idealism in all its variants recog-
nized, more or less, that the meaning of the text was transmitted to the reader by 
the author (to whom, however, all the responsibility for signifying was assigned), 
and for that reason did not ignore the fact that literature inevitably found its real-
ization in reading. 
But even if we reason in rigorously structuralist terms, the reclaimed auton-
omy of the text would somehow have been obliged to leave some space for the 
reader – the person who “constructs” the meaning of the text at the moment when 
he understands it, the person who sets in motion a meaning planned to commu-
nicate and not just to exist autonomously. However that may occur, it is clear that 
the reader must be considered an integral part of this process. It was a serious 
failure of orthodox structuralism not to pay due attention to him. If structuralism 
was disturbed by the subjectivism of the Author, the holder of intentions decep-
tive and impossible to grasp, it was equally disturbed by the subjectivism of the 
Reader, free to hold interpretations too often unverifiable. Indeed, to decipher the 
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intentionality of an imitation, what could the reader do except risk seeking out 
the psychological motivation? Would it be a tribute paid by one poet to another? 
Could it be a parody, or even a counterpoint? Or might it instead be an emulatory 
improvement on the model? Given these doubts, would it not be better to exercise 
some restraint and bring out objectively the relationship between the texts, and 
note the verifiable grafting of precipitated memories?
But this issue of intentionality is a problem, whether for a partisan of sub-
jectivist criticism or for his opponent. I, who always believed in the intentional-
ist character of the art of allusion, and who affirm my regret at not having suffi-
ciently emphasized its special status (as I could easily have done), am still not 
so sure that intentionality is the decisive criterion for judging allusion as a case 
different from other forms of intertextuality. If I am allowed a jesting comparison, 
I feel a bit like Galileo, who when he was forced to deny the Copernican hypoth-
eses in order to escape jail, even as he adjusted his thinking in accord with the 
prescribed immobility of earth, is supposed to have murmured to himself, “And 
yet it moves!”
But I will provide an instructive example to encourage everyone to form less 
drastic and better articulated opinions. The example is so close to undecidabil-
ity that it could stand as an intercessor on behalf of my past uncertainty. At the 
beginning of the second book of the Aeneid, Aeneas tells Queen Dido about the 
last night of Troy and the reversals suffered during his voyage as an exile. He 
opens his apology with this verse: 
“O queen, you ask me to renew unspeakable sorrow.”
Infandum, regina, iubes renouare dolorem. 
These first words to Dido closely recall (critics have never missed it) the exordium 
of one of Odysseus’ fables at the court of the Phaeacians. He too turns to a queen, 
here Arete, wife of Alcinoos (Od. 7. 241):
“O queen, it is difficult to tell you, one by one, my misfortunes.”
ἀργαλέον, βασίλεια, διηνεκέως ἀγορεῦσαι 
κήδεα …
The coincidence of situation – the proem to a painful narrative told to a queen 
who persuades the guest to speak out, in one case Arete, in the other Dido – 
allows Virgil to effect an echo. The poet of the Aeneid keeps his distinguished 
model in mind and intentionally alludes to it. The reader is invited to collaborate 
in the recalling of the verse, and to recognize the resemblances between the two 
texts in order to appreciate the variations more fully. Virgil has stolen a conspic-
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uous phrasing from Homer (and has made no effort to conceal his theft) but he 
has infused it with a strongly pathetic intonation. The connotation of suffering 
echoing in the adjective infandum is enough, in contrast with the bare denotation 
of the Greek adjective, to transform the verse. But there is more. Aeneas’ speech 
is a painful reactivation (renouare) of his subjective suffering, not just an objec-
tively stressful narrative of misadventures and misfortunes, as in the words of 
Odysseus. What really surprises the reader is to discover how Virgil has achieved 
this new intonation while fully respecting the materiality of the Homeric verse. 
The exterior similitude is impressive: there is faithful correspondence in the word 
order (ἀργαλέον, βασίλεια ~ infandum, regina), and the same metrical and rhyth-
mical cliché gives form to the sequence. Let us stop here and pass to another 
verse that we can put alongside it; then we will draw conclusions from the double 
comparison, but they will not be easy conclusions.
In the sixth book of the Aeneid, the book of the dead, Aeneas meets Dido’s 
shade and swears solemnly that it cost him great suffering to separate from her 
(458–60): “O queen, I swear by the stars, by the gods above, and by whatever 
faith there is in the depths of earth, that I left your shore against my will.”
 ... per sidera iuro,
per superos et si qua fides tellure sub ima est,
inuitus, regina, tuo de litore cessi.
The memory of a very different oath had occurred to Virgil, an oath dedicated to 
a very different situation. Callimachus had written a delightful courtier’s poem to 
celebrate Berenice, the young queen of Egypt, who offered a lock of her hair as a 
vow to guarantee the return of her groom Ptolemy from a campaign; the lock dis-
appeared from the temple in which it was dedicated, to reappear in the heavens 
as a new constellation. Catullus made a most elegant translation of The lock of 
Berenice.14 In his text the lock, having risen among the stars, turns to the queen 
and swears to her in these words (66.39 ff.): “Against my will, O Queen, did I leave 
your head, against my will; I swear it by you and your own head.”
inuita, o regina, tuo de uertice cessi,
inuita: adiuro teque tuumque caput!
Virgil’s imitation, despite very slight adaptation, is an integral transplant; the 
allusion to Catullus’ line is featured, it is an intentional display of theft. That 
is clear. But the function of the imitative relationship is not clear. If we want to 
14 I can only refer readers to the very rich study and commentary of N. Marinone, Berenice from 
Callimachus to Catullus, Rome, Edizioni dell’Ateneo 1984.
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hew to the objective facts of the text, we can note an obvious difference of regis-
ter between the model and its reuse; in Catullus everything is committed to the 
jesting incongruence between the gravity of the pathetic tone and the lightness of 
the theme (a drama of a lock swept up among the stars!); but in Virgil the sublime 
register of the oath is absolutely in keeping with the bitter pain of the sentiments 
expressed.15 But what can be said in connection with the intentions of the imi-
tator? There is only the path of subjective happenstance (which lies exposed to 
the subjectivity of the Author and the subjectivity of the Reader). Must we think 
that Virgil is “criticizing” and correcting Catullus? Or believe that Catullus was 
more serious and more emotional than he appears to us? Or will it be possible to 
hypothesize (alas!) an ironic touch in Aeneas’ self-defence? One of these hypoth-
eses is absurd, another reasonable, but both are too inclined to reconstruct the 
poet’s implied thoughts. The fact remains that Virgil appropriated from Catullus, 
producing a verse of most splendid artistry and so fitting to the pathetic grieving 
of the context, that it makes us repeat here what Macrobius (as we saw above) 
said in general about Virgil’s imitative artistry: “we see in amazement that the 
parts going back to other poets sit better in Virgil than in their original place.”
Let us start lining up the conclusions. We have seen that the hemistich 
infandum, regina, iubes (cut off by the hepthemimeral caesura) is in close cor-
respondence with Homer’s hemistich; indeed, it is as it were a natural memory, 
inasmuch as it refers back to a openly analogous narrative situation, namely the 
opening of Aeneas’ personal account to queen Dido, which is perfectly parallel 
to that of Odysseus to queen Arete. If we believe in the poet’s intentionality we 
ought to say that the allusion is directed to the latter – the Homeric model. 
The first possible conclusion, then, is that Virgil had Homer’s verse in mind 
and has retained the fixed metrical and verbal pattern that gives form to the 
hemistich inuitus, regina, tuo. But this hemistich, as we saw, is the first part of 
the line inuitus, regina, tuo de litore cessi, which repeats (with strong allusive 
power and hence, as we should believe, with open intentionality) the Catullan 
verse inuita, o regina, tuo de uertice cessi. Hence the second possible conclusion 
is that what Virgil had in mind was the line of Catullus, and he wanted his reader 
to recognize it. The “intentionalists” would have set to work, with extenuating 
and opposing efforts, to determine which was the originally predominant model, 
and from which direction the blessed “inspiration” had come to Virgil. But there 
is a third possible conclusion, one rather more aporetic. We should seek, rather 
15 I tried to give a detailed analysis of this imitation in Memoria dei poeti e sistema letterario, 
1974, pp. 65–68. I limit myself here to essentials; what interests me is discussing the problem of 
intentionality (which I wanted to challenge by means of the comparison of two sets of paired and 
competing illustrations).
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than feeling hesitant about the intentionality of an allusion, the path of objective 
observation and stick to phenomenological forms of relief. In short, we should be 
readers who see poetic reminiscence as an effect of the text, offered by the text to 
all comers, and who in reading gather echoes, admire transformations, and are 
surprised by gains in meaning. Paradoxically we will find in these exercises of 
imitation the most persuasive test of a great poetic originality. One cannot answer 
such a proposition better than did Eugenio Montale when he said: “the right kind 
of originality… is not what does not resemble anything; it is what persists in being 
irreducible to resemblances and what is guaranteed and conditioned by them.”16
Before dropping entirely my (reluctant) palinode on the Author’s possible 
intentionality when he consciously alludes to a foreign text, I shall yield to the 
temptation to propose one more example. My malicious objective is to make the 
problematic picture which I have outlined even more complex. Doubts usually 
bring me more benefit than certainties. In one of the best known (and most pre-
cious) poems of Carducci, Traversando la Maremma toscana, the poet derived a 
hendecasyllable from a sonnet of Petrarch (Rerum uulgarium fragmenta, 301, v. 9) 
and framed it in full view in his own text:
ben riconosco in te le usate forme
Petrarch’s sonnet is a song for Valchiusa, the cherished landscape of woods and 
streams, the silent scenario of the poet’s lament for his beloved Laura. The first 
verse of the first terzina sounds very much like that of the imitator:
ben riconosco in voi le usate forme
Carducci too wandered in a melancholy mood through a beloved landscape, and 
we expect that he would have been pleased to have appropriated so happily this 
verse of Petrarch. But that is not so. In fact, he wrote in a letter to a friend: “the 
fifth line is by Petrarch, but it won’t go away.”17 His intention, if we want to talk 
of intention, was rather to “get rid of” this verse, to transform it, to make it at all 
costs sufficiently different. But intentions do not count: this line emerging from 
the depths of his memory, transmigrating as if by its own uncontrollable nature, 
grafts itself magnificently into the new composition. That the entire poem of Car-
16 The italics are mine. I am drawing on a study by P.V. Mengaldo in “Quaderni del Circolo Filo-
logico-linguistico Padovano” 1, 1966, where these words are featured in an epigraph.
17 M. Valgimigli Resegone Citerone, in La Mula di Don Abbondio, Bologna, Cappelli 1954, 
pp. 137 ff.; see also M. Bettini in “Materiali e Discussioni per l’analisi dei testi classici” 6, 1981, 
p. 159.
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ducci was under the impact of a nostalgic memory bound to a landscape only 
too dear, as was already true of Petrarch’s sonnet, explains why the revenant pre-
sented itself to the mind of the poet and then would not go away again.18
In short, it is risky to seek in the text the conscious action of the author; his 
intention, whether reflexive or calculated, may be ambiguous, fleeting, often 
cheating. On the other hand, to discover models, both those voluntarily sought 
out and those involuntarily experienced, can tell us something more verifiable 
about the poet’s creativity, if not his consciousness: his tastes, his assimilated 
reading, the mnemonic workshop of his texts.
* * *
I said earlier that I would dedicate a few words to deploring the excesses of some 
enthusiastic disciples who, starting from Memoria dei Poeti or from the English 
version contained in The Rhetoric of Imitation have, in my opinion, distorted 
or outright denatured the critical framework that I was proposing. Rather than 
defend my ideas, I would like to defend the method, or better, to clarify its invio-
lable limits – inviolable because, if they are not respected, the method itself loses 
its validity. This is not an expression of personal resentment, indeed personally I 
am very content that someone is trying to muscle forward, that is to say advance 
the investigation of literary imitation and intertextuality. It is not the novelty that 
alarms me. What alarms me is that step by step, new presuppositions, reasonably 
motivated but free of all control, have actually assailed the fundamental criteria 
of textual analysis and in the end have fatally compromised the criteria them-
selves.
Structuralism, as I said before, quickly entered a crisis. Its fundamental 
acquisitions were certainly welcomed with agreement, but they lacked the doc-
trinal antibodies that would have immunized them against some external conta-
gions, which, although they could all be grouped under the heterogeneous label 
of post-structuralism, soon altered the primitive nucleus of its theory. The first 
phase of systematic structuralism, what we might call its orthodox form, founded 
on the objectivity of the text and the autonomy of language, had known how to 
inspire rigorous and fruitful studies in philology. But the happy marriage soon 
ended. It ended when certain currents of thought grafted themselves onto these 
theoretical bases: they answered to philosophical dicta foreign to the craftsman-
like empiricism of philology. Instead they celebrated irrationalism, unsystematic 
thought and the uncertain significance of the text. It was a mass assault, concen-
tric even if scattered. Gadamer’s hermeneutics (in his relationship to Heidegger), 
18 The letter of Carducci to Chiarini of 16 April 1885 (quoted by Valgimigli, cf. n. 17).
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the post-modernism of Lyotard, the deconstruction of Derrida, the psychoana-
lytic suggestions of Deleuze, the “irony” of Rorty, arrived from different fronts to 
put in question the very idea of truth, or at least the idea of truth in its capacity 
as self-evident.
All these ideas that we could almost define as nihilistic (or at least relativistic) 
have long since exhausted themselves and have remained fruitless. Indeed, for 
some time a new hunger for “sense” has been noticed, a renewed confidence in 
the concrete nature of language. Thus it may raise a smile that I should abandon 
myself to this unrestrained tirade against the betrayal of post-structuralism, now 
that Hannibal is no longer at the gates and it is no longer useful to raise alarms. 
But that is not the problem. It is simply that the venerable centuries of philolog-
ical studies, as well as their academic and scholastic nature, have often discour-
aged rapid innovation, thus condemning our studies to the delayed utilization 
of methods that in other fields of knowledge were already sinking into darkness. 
This is just what was seen and can still be seen in some recent works of philol-
ogy dedicated to imitation and intertextuality. Their authors still keep each other 
busy with post-structural inventions, urged on by the shared illusion that they are 
the critical avant-garde. 
Others before me have thundered in indignation at these fantastic inventions, 
but unfortunately they have done so as if the ideas that animated them were only 
the foolishness of clueless fellows, fantasies unworthy of even the least consid-
eration.19 The indignant protesters did not want to understand that behind these 
scandalous propositions stood critical principles respectable and well motivated 
in themselves, even if they were neither appropriate nor acceptable; their criteria 
of evaluation were quite different but all were equally deserving of a discussion 
free of contempt and worthy of deliberate refutation. It should be clear to every-
one that conformist thinking is worse than error.
At the root of the position of post-modernists, hermeneuticists and decon-
structionists lies the famous and so often discussed phrase of Nietszsche, unfor-
tunately misunderstood and arbitrarily isolated from the context of his compre-
hensive work; according to him: “there are no facts, but only interpretations.”20 
This is the stumbling block, a condemnation of positivism as guilty of limiting 
19 I have in mind the irritable and dismissive E. Narducci, Deconstructing Lucan. Ovvero le nozze 
(coi fichi secchi) di Ermete Trismegisto e di Filologia, in Interpretare Lucano: Miscellanea di Studi, 
ed. P. Esposito and L. Nicastri, Naples, Arte Tipografica 1999, pp. 39–83.
20 F. Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente 1885–1887, 7 (60), in Kritische Gesamtausgabe, 
Werke, ed. G. Colli and M. Montinari, Berlin, De Gruyter 1967– vol.VI/1 (Italian translation Fram­
menti postumi, in Opere Complete, ed. G. Colli and M. Montinari, Milan, Adelphi 1964, vol. VIII.1, 
p. 299.)
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itself only to bare phenomena. But Nietzsche was not proposing the negation of 
truth.21 He was a veteran philologist who believed in facts, as he repeated many 
times (especially in the last years of his life when he was justifying the honesty 
and courage of the seekers after truth and declared error to be the expression of 
baseness).22 So he kept truth and suspicion in tension (which accordingly, let us 
mention in parenthesis, is the mental habit that should guide the good philolo-
gist).
Hermeneuticists and deconstructionists have adhered variously to the “lin-
guistic turn” promoted by structuralism. But they have driven themselves too 
far, to the point of endangering its fundamental principles. In fact they have 
denied, in partial agreement with each other, that any autonomous reality can 
exist outside language and the text. Then they took another step, even more deci-
sive, in affirming that all our forms of knowledge are oriented by a sort of fore-
knowledge blended from uneliminable prejudices (Gadamer in particular): this 
is how the overcoming of structuralist orthodoxy finally compromised the very 
faith in objectivity that structuralism at its dawn had polemically championed 
against idealistic subjectivism. Thus it appeared totally normal to deny credit to 
language and its power of signifying things. The meaning of a text, once cut off 
from its roots, no longer depended on the rules of literary signification; it was 
instantly usurped by the Reader, who subjected it to his own unbridled inventive 
power. Philology suffered from this above all else. As a science of verification and 
inquiry, but also an art of interpretation of concrete and positive data, philology 
often had to weather the invasions of incautious critics, and became a field of 
exercise for many unfounded inferences.
The fact is that the devotees of classical literatures have not always familiar-
ized themselves in depth with the critical anxieties of post-structuralist critics; 
they have eavesdropped on their postulates without forming a full awareness of 
the implications which their crisis entailed. Otherwise they would have been able 
to resist the contagion. They have vaguely followed the new doctrinal principles 
(that is my opinion) without, however, understanding the risks associated with 
them. Certainly that is a consequence of the psychological insularity of classical 
studies, a discipline which rarely acts as a protagonist in conflicts and cultural 
changes. Mostly it reacts to change, and always with some delay. Rarely do its 
21 The problem is brilliantly treated in C. Ginzburg, History, Rhetoric and Proof, lectures given 
in Israel at the Menahem Stern Jerusalem University and published by Brandeis, The University 
Press of New England, Hanover 1999. There is now an Italian translation entitled Rapporti di 
Forza, Storia, retorica, prova, Milan, Feltrinelli 2000.
22 Compare B. Williams, Truth and Truthfulness. An essay in Genealogy, Princeton University 
Press 2002 (Italian translation Genealogie della Verità, Rome, Fazi 2005, pp. 17–23).
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members take the initiative. They did so once in the Romantic era, and from this 
was born an extraordinary stage of criticism, extraordinary for every literature 
and all philology; the reason for this exception is that the texts of Greek and Latin 
classicism themselves were on this occasion the central object of an impassioned 
dispute which proved highly innovative for the entire culture.
In its extensive history classical studies has experimented with everything, 
but its position has almost always been one of aristocratic restraint; on the one 
hand, it has an enclosed inheritance, a monumental legacy to protect; on the 
other, it possesses severe and cautious methods of study capable of guaranteeing 
a curated celebration of this inheritance: a history and a perspective inspired, 
in short, by an intelligent defence. It is astonishing that now, when the entire 
post-structural idea seems long since eclipsed, and it no longer appears naïve 
to show confidence in the veracity of language, there are still among classical 
philologists some delayed thinkers who, believing themselves pioneers of the 
first wave, have become fans of the “deconstruction” of texts. In fact, while they 
maintain that they are trying to interpret texts, they in fact toil to expose implicit 
prejudices, cracks in the meaning, hidden discontinuities, deceitful presupposi-
tions, contradictory ideological constructions, hidden or suppressed secondary 
meanings. In short, the crisis which for them had been late in arriving has like-
wise been slow to depart.
It is above all from the American reception of the thought of Derrida, through 
the mediation of P. de Man, that these critical tendencies, which are properly 
strange to the tradition of classical studies, derive their origin. The intrusion 
seems to be fostered by the peculiar American academic situation, in which the 
teaching of “Classics” and of “Comparative Literature” are often yoked, encour-
aging contamination between their methods of research. From this comes a strat-
egy of reading adapted to throw light on  the deviations, voids, fractures, dilem-
mas and incoherences of texts, despite their obvious structural unity. It is, so to 
speak, a strategy of listening to texts whereby the shrewd ear of the philologist 
attunes itself to dissonances and brings them into evidence.
* * *
The short Discours de la Méthode which I have just finished was intended as a 
preamble to a small collection of illustrative examples that I would like to use 
to demonstrate the concrete risks of a capricious intertextuality. If it crosses the 
limits of good sense, it also prejudices the efficacity of the method. I am con-
cerned about this hazard. I shall not mention either the names of offenders nor 
the places (articles and books) in which they have left traces of their intemper-
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ance. Parcere personis, dicere de uitiis is Martial’s indulgent rule which I have 
taken as mine. 
Let us start with the beginning of the Aeneid. Juno, the great goddess hostile 
to Troy, comes on stage immediately after the proem: she sees the fleet of the 
exiles guided by Aeneas as it calmly ploughs the sea along the coast of Sicily. The 
goddess’s anger explodes in a spiteful monologue. “Am I, defeated, to abandon 
my undertaking and shall I fail to divert the Trojan king from Italy?” (1.37 ff.): haec 
secum: “mene incepto desistere uictam…?” One scholar has not resisted the temp-
tation to think that Virgil, imitating Homer, wanted to display programmatically 
his affiliation to the great model of the Iliad by repeating its very first words (as a 
kind of title), Μῆνιν ἄειδε, θεά, “sing of the wrath, O goddess.” Is not the whole 
Aeneid occasioned by the wrath of Juno, just as the Iliad was occasioned by the 
anger of Achilles (his famous MENIN)? The idea lurking in the imitative echo is 
that Juno would provide as auspices for the narrative of the Aeneid a different 
action, an action capable of doing justice to her own anger. The intertextuality 
claimed would be concealed in Juno’s very first words: MEN(e) IN(cepto). The 
elision of the e would in fact produce in enunciation the Greek sequence MENIN. 
But there is no elision, that is, there is no loss of the terminal vowel e, but instead 
synaloepha, fusion of the two vowels; the pronuntiatio plena (nothing else was 
possible) did not eliminate the vowel e, which would still be heard as it blended 
into the successive syllable in­. Furthermore, the Greek sequence MENIN has a 
short final syllable –NIN, whereas the syllable IN­ of incepto is scanned as long. 
So there is no prosodic or phonetic possibility that the Greek sequence might 
strike the ear as similar to the Latin sequence. 
But this is not all. A scholar seized by enthusiasm for the discovery of this 
supposed Virgilian imitation has noted, with increased enthusiasm, that incepto 
would not just mean Juno’s “undertaking”; instead inceptum would indicate the 
literary “undertaking” constituted by the Aeneid itself, the poem which is just 
beginning. Here we have critical deconstruction full-scale: it is the theory of the 
“self-reflecting mirror,” according to which it is part of the specific nature of the 
literary text to speak about itself or about its composition (or decomposition). 
[But with a little pedestrian pedantry I would like to give warning that the word 
never appears in Virgil with this sense; the sense is possible only in the prosaic 
usage of Latin.]
Thus the poetic text would already contain in itself its own manner of 
deconstruction, inasmuch as it bears within it the rhetorical countersigns that 
characterize it as literary language. Here is an example. When Virgil, imitating 
Ennius, retrieves from him a long description of warriors occupied in felling 
timber for a funeral pyre, the Ennianizing verses are introduced by the hemistich 
Itur in antiquam silvam “they go into an ancient wood” (Aen. 6.179). According 
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to a willful critic (a little deconstructionist, a little hermeneuticist), the “ancient 
wood” entered by the woodcutters would also be Ennius’ own work, a noble text 
from the ancient Roman epic. In short, the Virgilian text would be recalling the 
archaic model, but accompanying it with a programmatic gesture of “reflexive 
annotation,” a marginal annotation absorbed into the epic narrative; as the poet 
narrates the action of felling the wood, he permits his awareness of his intertex-
tual labor to show through. I will give a better explanation. The poet describes 
an ancient wood but hides in its primary signification the following secondary 
sign: “Attention: the verses that you are reading are taken over from Ennius, the 
‘ancient wood’ of Roman epic poetry.” I don’t believe it, and further I ask myself 
what would be the advantage in believing it.
I understand that, according to the most orthodox hermeneuetic criteria 
(as far back as Schleiermacher, passing through his pupil Boeckh to arrive at 
Gadamer), interpretation should pursue the aim of understanding an author, 
when necessary, better than he understood himself. This is not the case. Virgil 
here explicitly imitates Ennius, and surely he is pleased with this theft: he scat-
ters clear signs of admission. The real point is that here the poet of the Aeneid 
simply has the intention of alluding to Ennius, and the reader is summoned to 
act by recognizing the allusion. This is the normal mechanism by which the play 
of intertextual allusion functions. There was no educated reader at Rome who 
would not instantly recognize the model; indeed he must have known the text of 
Ennius by heart, from having studied and re-studied it at school. The allusion is 
significant in and of itself; the additional level of meaning that would contain the 
poet’s reflection on his own verses (let us even say the higher level of meaning, 
whereby the text would speak about itself) exists solely in the mind of the fanta-
sizing interpreter. In no way does Virgil’s text give visible signs of behaving like 
a “self-reflecting mirror.” But fear not! For a deconstructionist this is surely no 
obstacle, since the literary text is, by its very nature, unstoppably deconstructing 
itself. I end with a perhaps unnecessary comment. The presence of a meta-lin-
guistic hidden meaning would have disturbed the “heated” effect of the grandi-
ose epic description by “chilling” the reader, detaching him from the emotional 
pace of the narrative. In short, Virgil would have spoiled the passage, like a man 
who ruins a joke by explaining it.
Do you want another example? Everyone knows that when Lesbia’s sparrow 
dies Catullus writes a delightful song of lament, moved by a spirit of jest. Corin-
na’s parrot dies and Ovid cannot resist the temptation of writing his own song 
equally full of grace and frivolity (Am .2.6). What neater homage could be paid 
by a chivalrous poet than to follow in the tracks of the leading poet of love and 
offer his beloved a jewel of witty imitation? Catullus invited all the Cupids to 
weep over the most cruel calamity that had made Lesbia’s lovely eyes red and 
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swollen with weeping: passer mortuus est meae puellae / passer deliciae meae 
puellae. Ovid opens with the sad announcement: psittacus, Eois ales imitatrix ab 
Indis, / occidit: exsequias ite frequenter aues: “the parrot, winged imitator among 
Indians, is dead. Come in great numbers, birds, and escort his obsequies.” The 
deconstructionist on duty could not fail: “the psittacus is called an imitatrix ales 
by Ovid not just because its nature is to mimic, but because its role in the Latin 
erotic tradition is to ‘imitate’ that particular bird celebrated by Catullus.” In other 
words, the parrot is an analog of the poet Ovid, who is imitating the poet Catullus: 
it does not matter that, when alive, that parrot really knew how to imitate human 
speech (v. 48 clamauit moriens lingua “Corinna, uale”: “his dying tongue cried 
‘farewell Corinna’”). His real function consisted in being the counterpart of Ovid, 
master in the art of literary imitation. This time too the poet, while apparently 
occupied in delivering a half-jesting funeral eulogy, would not be talking of any-
thing but himself.
I have said before that I am preoccupied with the defence of method. A 
method works if its procedures are treated with respect, as rules based on objec-
tive criteria of reason, intended to ensure verifiable results. Respecting the rules 
of a method entails the obligation to respect its limits. Philology is an art, but it 
aspires to the rigor of a science. But the limit of a science is precisely to reveal 
the limit and name it, including its own limit, indeed above all its own. What 
orthodox structuralism has left as an inheritance to classical studies is just this, 
a strong awareness of its own limits. Its criterion of intertextuality, a system-
atic procedure of imitation, has made us understand how literary texts are con-
structed and also how they work. By anchoring its idea of the text to the science of 
language structuralism has entrusted to words the positive capacity of meaning. 
If one wanted to simplify this, one might say that structuralism has followed the 
empiricist axiom of St. Thomas, with a few adjustments: Nihil est in intellectu 
quod prius non fuerit in textu. This can be paraphrased: it is not possible to under-
stand the sense of a text if one does not keep close to what it concretely declares. 
In fact, the structure of the text has the capacity to motivate its linguistic signs, 
that is, it gives them a necessary meaning which is the text’s own meaning and 
not some other, which would not be motivated because it was not functional in 
the structure of the text.
The intertextuality preached by orthodox structuralism, I repeat, was 
founded on the idea that the entire corpus constituted by the Graeco-Latin liter-
ary tradition set up a system, an accumulation of literary memories that could be 
synchronically ordered, ready to foster and condition the creation of new poetic 
compositions; but they were memories ready to find a creative function in the 
new context, and to be integrated into it, as if always visible and outright inten-
tional, as in the case of open allusions. In short, they were “presences,” explicit 
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elements, linguistically expressed and philologically verifiable. On the other 
hand, the quite different intertextuality of the deconstructionists is made out of 
“absences”: a previous text would be recalled because in its place, in the new 
text, there is a void, an unsatisfied expectation, a cleft in the discourse which 
stays open, like an unrealized contact. It is an intertextuality, if I can put it like 
this, created in order to disjoint the text. Its most serious defect is to forget that, 
if the system of models for imitation is spacious, only some of those possible 
models are in practice made pertinent and so retrieved in the act of poetic cre-
ation.  Many others, very many indeed, are obviously left outside, unactivated. 
To consider them functional ingredients of the text and mobilize them as con-
stituent components of its meaning is utterly arbitrary and misleading – quite 
simply, a blunder. Unless, of course, one wants to consider their missing presence 
in the text as the outcome of censorship, like the absence of signs that would be 
repressed in the author’s consciousness. The consequences of such a proposition 
are serious: not a few interpreters, exempted from the burden of sure proof (“let 
us leave the words, and instead look beneath them!”), abandon themselves to 
utterly willful exegetic fantasies. 
Here is an exemplary instance. An inventive interpreter starts from the 
assumption, partly true, partly exaggerated, that Dido is modelled on the Medea 
of Euripides.23 Certainly Dido, like Medea, is a woman abandoned by her man, 
though not on account of another woman. And her invectives against Aeneas to 
some extent resemble those of Medea against Jason: Virgil knew how to learn 
much from Euripides, that brilliant explorer of female suffering and poet of 
extreme pathos. In book IV of Virgil’s poem Dido has two tempestuous meetings 
with Aeneas. In the first she begs him in tears, still hoping to sway him; in the 
second she has long since despaired and curses him with loathing. This is a dra-
matic progression, destined to end with her suicide, the extreme act with which 
the queen redeems her humiliated pride. 
At the end of the first encounter, in an attempt to melt Aeneas’ frozen resolve, 
she sounds a tender note (327–30): “O, if at least I had had a son by you before 
your flight, if a little Aeneas played in my palace, to recall your features to me, 
I would not seem, no, to be totally betrayed and deserted”: si quis mihi paruulus 
aula / luderet Aeneas, qui te tamen ore referret. In connection with the paruulus 
Aeneas and Dido’s lament for her lost maternity, our interpreter senses “a sinister 
irony” resounding in those pathetic words. Behind (beneath) the words of the 
grief-stricken queen (“if only I had a little Aeneas …”) our shrewd reader infers 
her unexpressed desire to kill that paruulus Aeneas and so make herself abso-
23 Just as relevant to her character, and perhaps more marked, is the suggestion of the Ajax of 
Sophocles; I have discussed this in The Poetry of Pathos, Oxford 2007, pp. 158–60.
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lutely the rival of Medea, the murderess of her sons. Under this hypothesis, the 
model of the tragic Medea invented by Euripides would have driven Virgil com-
pletely, yielding not a selective retrieval of some assimilable poetic features, but 
a calque, a matching copy (in this respect it is unfortunate that Medea too did not 
commit suicide on a pyre, but instead fled by magic means on a chariot drawn by 
winged steeds).
There is even someone, seized by enthusiasm for this foreign notion, who 
wanted to add, with a kind of supporting argument, that the words paruulus 
Aeneas, qui te tamen ore referret would prove that the motive for Dido’s wish to 
kill her son is the “resemblance” to Aeneas. But not even Medea kills her sons 
because they look like their father Jason, certainly not in Euripides’ text. The text 
of Virgil is clear: the relative qui te tamen ore referret corrects paruulus: “a little 
Aeneas, who although little, would still recall you in his features.” The diminutive 
paruulus, it is agreed, is a unique instance in the Aeneid; its affective connota-
tions are quite foreign to the lofty language of epic. Virgil has taken it from the 
lexicon of love-poetry, which knows how to indulge in endearments and caresses. 
He wanted it here where the grandeur of the epic-heroic discourse (already tinged 
with tragic colours) yields for a moment to the sweetness of feminine sentiment; 
here it is not the offended queen who is talking. 
We must have patience with the fantasist tendency of interpreters; we know, 
after all, that poetry signifies more than it says. However, to me the severe damage 
that is inflicted on Virgil and his exceptional sensibility as a poet of compassion 
by bringing Medea into the picture is insupportable. Dido’s allusion to the lack 
of a little son is the demented complaint of a woman in love, it is the tormented 
bitterness of a lost opportunity: these words (I repeat) are contained in the first 
invective, when Dido still deludes herself that she can prevent Aeneas from 
departing and is choosing words that might move him; they could not have stood 
in the second, a desperate invective brimming with curses and implacable spite. 
The victim of fatal events and the intrigue of pitiless goddesses, Dido wins in rec-
ompense the full sympathy of her poet, who encourages with delicacy the most 
human emotions of her spirit. All this is brutally thrust aside by an interpretation 
that, while it believes that it understands more, substitutes for what is in the text 
what could never have been in it. The loss is enormous; not only is the meaning 
of the words perverted but the affective resonances of bitterness and regret are 
eliminated from the text – though they are as Virgilian as can be.
But someone will answer (voicing the theories of Harold Bloom, another too 
influential post-structuralist from the United States) that “misunderstanding” or 
“misreading” is the attitude that normally governs how all new poetry relates 
itself to the previous poetic tradition – an attitude that would be proper also to 
criticism, which creatively interprets, and misunderstands, a literary text. It is 
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obvious to everyone that Ovid could have misunderstood Virgil’s art, but the 
meaning of the text of Virgil did not therefore change. Ovid practiced his own 
trade, Virgil remained Virgil.24 It is not accidental, in fact, that our interpreter (a 
self-titled connoisseur of Virgil’s unconscious, but not in the least conscious of 
the limits of the method) describes his deviant reader like this: “a reader whom 
we could call ‘Ovidian’, one who instinctively takes account of potentially embar-
rassing implications which the authority of an intertextual model could bring of 
its own accord.” Even the interpreter himself realizes that his idea is better suited 
to Ovid than to Virgil. But this is no problem for him. Indeed, he says, we have 
“the authority of an intertextual model” which legitimizes the idea. The authority 
of an intertextual model? That is just what is missing. In fact there is no intertex-
tual model, there is no specific recall of a genuinely extant text for us to confront. 
What we have is only an intermittent contact between two literary characters, the 
recurrence of a few elements common to Medea and Dido: they are isolated pieces 
of a complex mosaic which Virgil has seen in Euripides and has briefly retrieved 
to construct the story of his abandoned heroine.
One should always keep in mind that an imitation, a reminiscence, does 
not share everything that is present in the model. At times only its signifiers are 
mobilized, at other times only the signified; on one occasion it is the form of 
expression which is stolen, on other occasions the content. For the most part, the 
contacts with the model are accidental fragments of text that transmigrate, resur-
facing from the most spacious repository of literary tradition. A grave blunder, 
and one of the most common, is to imagine that an imitation carries with it the 
whole load of meaning of the prototype, contained in every part of it, through 
its whole textual development. Then there is another methodological condition 
that must not be neglected: allusion wants to mark the theft by leaving a trail of 
recognizable traces. The stolen text has its own story, which makes it noble and 
precious. Appropriation, precisely because it is an act of force and display, does 
not hide the name of the previous owner, but leaves unmistakeable signs of his 
identity. This is the crucial point of the enquiry: the signs. These are there to alert 
the reader and the philologist, precisely because in their absence intertextuality 
does not work. Systematic structuralism and literary semiology made signs the 
substance of texts, and never wanted to dispense with them in their theorizing. To 
seek meanings to which no adequate signs (I mean adequate words and expres-
sions) correspond is not among the duties of philology. We might grant that the 
24 In fact, Ovid in Dido’s letter (Her. 7.132–8) develops the idea that the queen would destroy the 
child, even if Dido does not want to kill with her own hand the son conceived with Aeneas (as 
in Medea’s case). Rather, the son would die in her womb on the pyre of suicide. If anything, for 
Virgil’s Dido, the lament for a child unconceived is a lament for having no reason to remain alive.
 A critical retrospective: method and its limits   61
dissemination of meaning can also be a stimulus for new interpretations, but this 
is not in the power of the intertextual method to deliver. The method gives a good 
harvest, its own fruit, and cannot give more; its strength consists in accepting its 
own limits. To cross those limits cancels out, illico et immediate, its validity.

